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1 
LESSONS FROM THE SUBPRIME DEBACLE: 
STRESS TESTING CEO AUTONOMY 
STEVEN A. RAMIREZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance in the United States played a central role1 in the 
historic subprime debacle now gripping the global economy.2  According to 
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, American CEOs run corporations as a 
“personal feifdom, not for the shareholders, but for their own benefit.”3  He 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Business Law Center at Loyola University in Chicago.  
The author received his B.A. in economics from the University of Missouri in 1983 and his J.D. 
from Saint Louis University School of Law in 1986.  The author thanks Laughlin Carter for 
outstanding research assistance.  Questions regarding this article are welcome via email at 
sramir3@luc.edu. 
 1. While this article focuses on one factor of the subprime mortgage crisis—corporate 
governance—in reality, a complex set of factors triggered and exacerbated the subprime mortgage 
crisis.  See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role 
of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2295 (2008) (arguing that the subprime 
mortgage crisis shows the need for a delinquency management regime as part of a unified housing 
policy); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 404 (2008) (arguing that conflicts, complacency and 
complexity each played a significant role in the subprime crisis and that these factors can be 
addressed through financial regulation on only a limited basis); David Reiss, Subprime 
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary 
Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.  REV. 985, 1065 (2006) (arguing that rating agencies must be 
regulated to prevent them from facilitating the spread of subprime mortgages and predatory loans 
into global financial markets).  More generally, scholars identify that “money-driven American 
political system” pervasively eroded important elements of regulatory infrastructure within the 
financial sector.  Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put” 
Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown (Part I), 38 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3, 6 
(2009). 
 2. Richard Katz, The Japan Fallacy: Today’s U.S. Financial Crisis Is Not Like Tokyo’s 
“Lost Decade,” 88 FOREIGN AFF. Mar–Apr. 2009, at 9, 10, available at http://www.foreign 
affairs.org/20090301facomment88202p10/richard-katz/the-japan-fallacy.html (stating that a 
major cause of the financial crisis was the failure of the federal government to regulate the system 
of CEO compensation—“a system that in its current form gives executives incentives to take 
outrageous risks with other people’s money”). 
 3. Interview by Neil Conan with Joseph Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia University, Talk of 
the Nation: Economists Explain How to Save Capitalism, (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95906243. 
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claims that CEOs “reported high profits, gave big bonuses, big stock options, 
but in fact there were huge risks buried off-balance sheet and those chickens 
have now come home to roost.”4  Another Noble prize winning economist, 
Paul Krugman, states that “the subprime crisis and the credit crunch are, in an 
important sense, the result of our failure to effectively reform corporate 
governance after the last set of scandals.”5  These economists are hardly alone 
in their critique.6  CEOs now exercise sufficient autonomy to devastate their 
firms through recognition of illusory profits and deferral (even burial) of lethal 
risks.7  Given its staggering costs, the subprime crisis stands as the starkest 
indictment of our system of corporate governance.8  The law is simply failing 
to contain agency costs in the U.S. public corporation.9 
Even prior to the subprime fiasco, critiques of American corporate 
governance populated economic and finance literature.10  High-profile legal 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Paul Krugman, Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37 (describing how 
the system of executive compensation encourages high-risk decision making). 
 6. See, e.g., Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, Management Needs to Become a Profession, 
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at 12, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14c053b0-9e40-11dd-
bdde-000077b07658.html (arguing that the financial crisis shows the need for professional 
standards for firm managers);  Krishna Guha, Fed Governor Urges Bankers Pay Reform, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5037f4c2-e40d-11dc-8799-0000779fd2ac.html 
(Federal Reserve Board Governor arguing that bankers’ compensation encourages excessive risk). 
 7. James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to Corporate 
Governance, 5 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 295, 295 (2008) (showing that corporate 
governance failed to assure that CEO compensation was even “remotely” linked to performance). 
 8. The total cost of the subprime debacle is difficult to calculate.  Nevertheless, as of this 
writing, the U.S. government has assumed $9.7 trillion in obligations in an effort to save the 
financial system.  Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, U.S. Taxpayers Risk $9.7 Trillion on Bailout 
Programs, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
Washingtonstory&sid=aGq2B3XeGKok.  Additionally, global equity markets suffered trillions 
more in losses associated with the subprime crisis.  See e.g., Press Release, Wilshire Associates, 
Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Loses $6.9 Trillion in 2008: Worst Year Ever for Broad Market Index 
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.wilshire.com/Company/PressRoom/PressReleases/ 
Article.html?article=WARelease091501.htm.  Consequently, the subprime debacle amounts to a 
multi-trillion-dollar economic catastrophe. 
 9. This Article focuses on public corporation, traded on a national securities exchange and 
marked by dispersed ownership, rather than the private firm marked by concentrated ownership 
blocks.  See Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and 
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 129, 130 
(2009) (distinguishing between agency problems under dispersed ownership structures and hold-
up problems arising from control exercised by concentrated shareholder ownership). 
 10. See, e.g., D. QUINN MILLS, WHEEL, DEAL AND STEAL: DECEPTIVE ACCOUNTING, 
DECEITFUL CEOS, AND INEFFECTIVE REFORMS 183 (2003) (“CEOs have found a way to 
enormously increase their own wealth by a variety of means in a period in which shareholders 
have been losing their shirts . . . .  [T]he core of the problem faced by investors today, as revealed 
by corporate scandals, is that investors must be better protected from CEOs.”); Paul Gompers et 
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scholars joined these attacks.11  I previously argued that corporate governance 
at public firms had devolved into CEO primacy,12 and long warned that the 
current system would lead to financial instability,13 historic macroeconomic 
disruptions,14 and costly taxpayer bailouts of financial firms.15  Sophisticated 
investors warned that corporate governance had undergone a “pathological 
mutation” away from shareholder capitalism and toward “managers’ 
capitalism.”16  Persistent scandals, such as the failure of Enron and other high-
profile firms in 2001–2002, suggested that CEOs simply exercised too much 
autonomy to line their pockets at the expense of shareholders and general 
 
al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 145 (2003) (finding that 
potential gains from improvements in corporate governance “would be enormous”); Charles P. 
Himmelberg et al., Investment, Protection, Ownership and the Cost of Capital 38–39 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2834, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
303969 (noting that “there is still substantial room for improvement in the design of the legal and 
regulatory environment for financial contracting and corporate governance” even in developed 
countries like the United States). 
 11. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 10 (2004) (stating that excessive 
compensation payments to CEOs result from excessive CEO power and impose costs beyond just 
the quantum of excessive payments, including costs associated with distorted incentives); Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through 
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 451 (2005) (“Enron suggests that the costs of eliminating 
[directors’] liability completely and thereby allowing corporate malfeasance to go unchecked are 
simply unacceptable.”); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 95, 114 (2004) (stating that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to a “dramatic increase in 
the ratio of the compensation of the corporate CEO to that of the average corporate blue collar 
employee” from 42 to 1 in 1980 to 475 to 1 in 2000). 
 12. Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory 
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 334 (2007) [hereinafter Ramirez, The 
End of Corporate Governance Law] (“CEO primacy is a direct outcome of the system of 
corporate governance law that devolved in the 1980s and 1990s into a dictatorship of 
management, by management, and for management.”). 
 13. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing 
with the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1084 (1999) (“The 
. . . ‘reforms’ of private securities litigation are a betrayal of . . . the federal securities laws and 
expose our financial system to risks that are not fully appreciated.  A more reactionary cycle 
could hardly have been imagined by the promulgators of the federal securities laws in the early 
1930s.”) [hereinafter Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform]. 
 14. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 
561, 572–73 (2000) (stating that although the costs of lost investor confidence arising from lax 
securities laws and other corporate governance mechanisms may “come due only once a century, 
when they are paid, the viability of capitalism itself can be called into question”). 
 15. Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(k): Congressional Subsidizing 
of Negligent Banks Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 689 (1996) (predicting 
that dilution of the duty of care for bank directors would lead to more trillion-dollar bank bailouts 
and is “tantamount to telling taxpayers: ‘Keep that checkbook open!’”). 
 16. See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005). 
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financial stability.17  The options backdating scandals18 suggested more reform 
was needed beyond the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).19  Yet, the 
macroeconomic consequences of inferior corporate governance never before 
reached the staggering levels of lost output suffered beginning in 2007 and 
continuing through today.20 
Global financial institutions now face a historic struggle to remain 
solvent.21  The events of late 2008 illustrate the unprecedented magnitude of 
the problem.  On September 7, 2008, the United States Treasury announced 
that the U.S. government was seizing control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
two government sponsored entities that together guaranteed $5.4 trillion22 in 
mortgage backed securities.23  Secretary Paulson stated that if the government 
failed to take these steps, “great turmoil”24 would follow in world financial 
 
 17. Douglas Guerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37 
(stating that with regard to the corporate failures of 2001–2002, “highly placed executives used 
their power . . . to achieve financial targets fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further enrich 
themselves via compensation schemes that rewarded those achievements”). 
 18. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock 
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2007) (finding that backdated options at forty-eight 
sampled companies resulted in approximately $500,000 in extra compensation for executives 
while costing shareholders at each company $389 million in market capitalization).  “Recent 
research has established that many executives exert both legal and illegal influence over their 
compensation.”  Id. at 1641.  “[O]ur evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zero-sum 
game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.”  Id. 
 19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 20. The Congressional Budget Office is currently projecting a $2 trillion shortfall in GDP 
relative to potential GDP during 2009 and 2010, with no full recovery in sight until 2015.  This 
would make the current contraction the most economically significant downturn since the Great 
Depression.  The State of the Economy and Issues in Developing an Effective Policy Response: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of Douglas W. 
Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/ 
doc9967/01-27-StateofEconomy_Testimony.pdf.  Of course, it is impossible to determine the 
extent of losses exclusively attributable to flawed corporate governance. 
 21. Henry Meyer & Ayesha Daya, Roubini Predicts U.S. Losses May Reach $3.6 Trillion, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid= 
aS0yBnMR3USk&refer=home (quoting New York University economist Nouriel Roubini that 
the U.S. banking system is “effectively insolvent”). 
 22. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart 
(Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e30472a6-7e79-11dd-b1af-000077b 
07658,dwp_uuid=5db90a0e-4e6c-11dd-ba7c-000077b07658.html. 
 23.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. 
on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and 
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm. 
 24. Id.  In 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accounted for nearly for 80% of the U.S. 
mortgage market.  Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. 
Lockhart (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_statement 
_090708hp1128.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] LESSONS FROM THE SUBPRIME DEBACLE 5 
markets.25  On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the 
largest ever.26  This caused a virtual freeze in global credit markets and a 
destructive credit contraction.27  On September 18, Treasury Secretary, Henry 
Paulson, and chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke, warned 
Congressional leaders of imminent economic meltdown without an immediate 
Wall Street bailout.28  On October 4, 2008, the U.S. government committed to 
provide a $700 billion bailout of its largest banks—reflecting only a fraction of 
the likely total cost of saving insolvent banks.29  These actions represent the 
most sweeping government interventions into the economy since the Great 
Depression.30  Economist Nouriel Roubini of New York University noted the 
change: “Socialism is indeed alive and well in America; but this is socialism 
for the rich, the well connected and Wall Street. A socialism where profits are 
privatized and losses are socialized.”31  The costs of all these bailouts are not 
known, but the financial system as a whole has surely lost trillions.32 
What is known is that the United States and the world are facing a major 
financial crisis and that it was triggered by home loans—subprime loans made 
to borrowers that really could not repay lenders.33  The entire crisis has its 
 
 25. The takeover of Fannie and Freddie doubled the national debt.  Krishna Guha et al.,  
Cost of US Loans Bail-Out Emerging, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
e30472a6-7e79-11dd-b1af-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=5db90a0e-4e6c-11dd-ba7c-000077b076 
58.html. 
 26. Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy After Suitors 
Balk (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=a6cDDYU5QYyw&refer=home. 
 27. David Goldman, Credit Freeze: What Lehman Wrought, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 16, 
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/14/news/economy/two_months_since_lehman/index.htm. 
 28. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Behind Closed Doors, Warnings of Calamity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at C5. 
 29. James Politi, Global Financial Crisis: House Makes “Most of Bad Hand,” FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2008, at 2. 
 30. Deborah Solomon et al., Mortgage Bailout Is Greeted with Relief, Fresh Questions, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at A1. 
 31. Nouriel Roubini, Comrades Bush, Paulson and Bernanke Welcome You to the USSRA 
(United Socialist State Republic of America), RGEMONITOR, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.rge 
monitor.com/roubini-monitor/253529/comrades_bush_paulson_and_bernanke_welcome_you_to_ 
the_ussra_united_socialist_state_republic_of_america. 
 32. By late 2008, total worldwide losses from loans exceeded $1 trillion.  Nancy Marshall-
Genzer, Marketplace: Global Bank Losses Total $1 Trillion (American Public Media radio 
broadcast Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/12/ 
18/global_bank_losses/. 
 33. The subprime crisis is “[s]hocking because a pack of the highest-paid executives on the 
planet . . . managed to lose tens of billions of dollars on exotic instruments built on the shaky 
foundation of subprime mortgages.”  Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, 
FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 65 [hereinafter Tully, Money Machine Breaks Down].  The senseless 
subprime lending reached a fever pitch in 2007; less than one year later, loans originated in that 
year defaulted at a rate of 31.25%.  Al Yoon, US Prime Mortgage Defaults Worsen Faster than 
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roots in such simple ideas that Fortune magazine ran a cover that asked, “What 
Were They Smoking?”34  The financial turmoil sparked soaring 
unemployment, raising the specter of further mortgage defaults.35  Economists 
suggested that as of late 2008, the government’s prodigious effort to contain 
the catastrophe “seems to be failing.”36  By any measure, the subprime crisis 
has impaired the ability of world financial markets to channel capital to 
productive uses37 and has cost the global economy trillions in forgone GDP.38 
America’s flawed system of corporate governance operated to allow CEOs 
to harvest huge compensation payments while offloading staggering risks upon 
their companies and the global economy generally.39  Corporate governance in 
America simply continues to leave too much power in the hands of the CEO, 
and the subprime mortgage debacle empirically proves just how pernicious that 
can be.40  The political power and wealth that CEOs control implies political 
 
Subprime, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN225639 
1220080822. 
 34. What Were They Smoking?, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 66. 
 35. Sudeed Reddy & Kelly Evans, Jobless Rate of 6.1% Fuels Economic Debate, WALL ST. 
J., Sept 6–7, 2008, at A1, A4 (“[T]he job losses sparked concern that housing markets would 
continue to slide because more people would have trouble meeting mortgage payments . . . . 
[leading to a] ‘negative feedback loop.’”). 
 36. See e.g., Paul Krugman, The Power of De, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A23. 
 37. David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown 
(Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.chicagogsb.edu/usmpf/docs/ 
usmpf2008confdraft.pdf (estimating total lost loan volume from subprime debacle to amount to 
$2 trillion, based upon an estimate of $900 billion in losses). 
 38. The IMF projects world GDP growth to be about 1.1 to 1.2% lower than 2007 in both 
2008 and 2009; in a $60 trillion global economy that amounts to $1.2 trillion in forgone global 
output.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HOUSING AND BUSINESS 
CYCLE 1–5 (Apr. 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/ (calling the subprime 
debacle “the largest financial shock since the Great Depression”).  More recently, the IMF 
projects essentially zero global growth, implying trillions more in forgone GDP.  Global Growth 
to Stall, IMF Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009, at D6 (growth is expected at 0.5% for 2009).  The 
IMF also increased its estimate of total financial losses from the crisis to $2.2 trillion.  Id. 
 39. A recent study of compensation for senior executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers found, for example, that while the top five executives at these firms pocketed billions 
from the sale of stock (as well as in salary) from 2000–2008, shareholders faced a total loss of 
investment.  “As a result, the bottom line payoffs for these executives during 2000–2008 were not 
negative but decidedly positive.”  Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513522.  
Economists and other commentators suggest that flawed corporate governance contributed to the 
financial turbulence during the dotcom bubble and the lead-up to the Great Depression.  ROY C. 
SMITH & INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN CORPORATION: CAPITAL MARKETS, 
CORPORATE CONTROL, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 116–17 (2006). 
 40. I have argued that corporate governance in the United States was based upon CEO 
primacy, in that the law seemed to operate to place the interests of CEOs ahead of all other 
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distortions in the law of corporate governance, and today the world is paying 
the cost of the perverse incentives American corporate governance yields.41  
This Article posits that sound corporate governance must operate to stem CEO 
autonomy, even under conditions of financial stress.  It further illustrates the 
means by which the legal infrastructure of American corporate governance 
could operate to prevent the kind of macroeconomic crisis that our nation now 
suffers through.  The prime culprits in the subprime debacle are well known—
a disproportionate amount of the losses can be traced to a handful of financial 
behemoths.42  These financial behemoths include banks, insurance companies, 
thrifts, investment banks, and mortgage brokerages.43  These companies 
transcend any one regulatory scheme, such as banking regulation or securities 
regulation—but they are all public companies listed in the United States, and 
as such, they all operated pursuant to American corporate governance 
standards.44  State law primarily regulated some of these firms and federal 
 
corporate constituents including the nominal firm owners—the shareholders.  I also argued that 
the underlying political structure of corporate law needed to be reformulated to prevent serial 
crises spawned by flawed corporate governance.  Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance 
Law, supra note 12, at 358. 
 41. Id. (“At both the federal and state level, corporate governance outcomes seem best 
explained by special interest influence, accompanied by transient disruptions triggered by 
financial crises.”). 
 42. For example, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and Washington Mutual accounted for $120 
billion in asset write downs and losses.  Hall of Shame, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2008, at 71.  
Compare that with total write downs of over $500 billion, as of August 2008.  Yalman Onaran, 
Banks’ Subprime Losses Top $500 Billion on Writedowns (Update1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 
12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY#. 
 43. Citigroup is the nation’s largest bank.  Tully, Money Machine Breaks Down, supra note 
33, at 66.  Merrill Lynch is the nation’s largest securities brokerage firm.  David Ellis, Merrill 
Lynch Reports $4.9 Billion Loss, CNNMONEY.COM, July 17, 2008. http://money.cnn.com/2008/ 
07/17/news/companies/merrill_lynch/index.htm?postversion=2008071716.  Washington Mutual 
was the nation’s largest thrift.  Drew Desilver et al., End of WaMu: Feds Seize Seattle Thrift in 
Nation’s Largest Bank Failure, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. The key point is that the 
full array of financial institutions played major roles in the subprime debacle, suggesting that the 
problem is broader than any single regulatory scheme, and instead pointing to the one regulatory 
element they had in common—American corporate governance for public companies. 
 44. All companies that are publicly traded in the United Sates are subject to the federal 
securities laws.  See Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 13, at 1060 n.13.  
Unfortunately, in the mid-1990s, Congress eviscerated private enforcement under the securities 
laws pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act.  Id. at 1080 (“[The PSLRA] is a further move toward the risky strategy 
of financial deregulation.  The original conception of federal securities regulation—that the nation 
needed federal regulation to create more stringent standards of conduct than those prevailing 
under state law—seems to have been lost in the shuffle.”).  Similarly, virtually all American 
public companies have eliminated any duty of care liability for their putative prime managers—
the board of directors.  Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 359–60 
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agencies regulated others.45  Yet virtually every firm that played a major role 
in generating46 the crisis looked to the uniquely American system of corporate 
federalism for its corporate governance standards.47  Consequently, corporate 
governance at public firms must be a primary area of inquiry and reform. 
Part I of this Article will assess the best existing evidence addressing the 
appropriate level of CEO autonomy; this necessarily requires weighing the 
need for unified leadership and strategic vision against potential agency costs 
arising from excessive CEO autonomy.  Part II will test that model against the 
stress of the subprime debacle.  It will show that our system of corporate 
governance failed that test and that a central problem of the subprime debacle 
involved excessive CEO autonomy to fatten profits (and therefore, 
compensation payments) without regard to the risk of future losses absorbed by 
firms.48  Part III will explain the political origins underlying flawed corporate 
governance standards applicable to American public firms.  Essentially, 
corporate governance relies too much upon state law to optimize corporate 
governance standards, and state law is inherently riddled with a political 
structure that distorts incentives for the states, especially Delaware, to 
appropriately contain agency costs through corporate governance law.  Part IV 
 
(2006) (arguing that allowing directors to be “infinitely careless” through the virtual abolition of 
the duty of care is a “dangerous source of macroeconomic instability”). 
 45. For example, AIG was the world’s largest insurer, and because the federal government 
does not regulate insurance, its primary business was regulated by states, particularly by New 
York.  The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter AIG Hearings] (statement of Eric 
Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department), available at http://oversight. 
house.gov/documents/20081007100906.pdf. 
 46. Although the subprime frenzy was made in America, many firms across the world 
suffered losses.  See, e.g., Hall of Shame, supra note 42, at 71.  For the most part, these firms 
were investors in subprime mortgages and were not involved in originating subprime mortgages.  
See, e.g., AIG Hearings, supra note 45, at 3.  This Article does not address possible flaws in the 
corporate governance standards of any nation other than the United States, or the possible 
distortions in such standards arising from similar political dynamics.  See REINIER KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 52 
(2004) (attributing lack of scrutiny applicable to manager decisions transnational to concerns that 
too much liability could make managers overly risk averse).  In light of the global subprime 
crisis, it would seem that risk averse managers are hardly a concern. 
 47. Corporate federalism refers to the blended authority of states and the federal government 
over questions of corporate governance.  William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 624 (2006).  Under 
the internal affairs doctrine, the state that charters the corporation supplies the substantive law 
defining the duties owed by managers and directors of corporations.  Id. at 624–25.  The federal 
government periodically intervened to preempt state law with national governance standards, 
most prominently through the promulgation of the federal securities laws.  Id. at 620. 
 48. Tully, Money Machine Breaks Down, supra note 33, at 66 (stating that the “fee engine” 
became so compelling that firms booked the income without regard to long term losses). 
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will address the shortcomings in our system of corporate governance revealed 
in this Article, with specific suggestions for reconfiguring the board of 
directors to curtail CEO autonomy.  Corporate governance law needs to 
actually reduce agency costs rather than endow CEOs with unfettered 
autonomy over their firms, and implementation of these changes will require 
further federal intervention.49  The ultimate conclusion is that the subprime 
mortgage crisis could have easily been prevented or mitigated through sound 
corporate governance. 
Excessive CEO autonomy is a multi-trillion dollar problem.  The American 
system of corporate governance has failed yet again to appropriately contain 
agency costs in the context of the publicly held corporation.  As University of 
Chicago Finance Professor Raghuram Rajan states, “Unless we fix incentives 
in the financial system we will get more risk than we bargain for.”50  In this 
instance, this excessive risk proved highly toxic to public firms as well as the 
global economy.51  Unless the legal system responds to these lessons, the 
world will continue to suffer from serial macroeconomic crises, as it has been 
since the advent of CEO primacy in American corporate governance.  This 
Article seeks to optimize corporate governance applicable to public firms in 
terms of CEO autonomy, based upon the best evidence regarding appropriate 
levels of CEO power, as tested in the cauldron of the subprime debacle. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF CEO AUTONOMY 
Most states do not require the centralization of operational power in any 
particular officer, much less one called a CEO.  Delaware serves as the prime 
example.52  Delaware dominates the market for chartering public 
corporations.53  Moreover, the approach that Delaware takes to the statutory 
 
 49. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[I]t is 
generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make 
optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.”).  The problem of agency costs within the 
corporation has bedeviled shareholders and scholars from the very inception of corporate power; 
in fact, agency costs are inherent to the issuance of corporate equity.  Id. at 312–13.  Controlling 
agency costs is key to the economic basis of the public corporation.  See id. at 357. 
 50. Raghuram Rajan, Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at 11 
(noting the incentives for CEOs and financial managers to tolerate excessive risks that increase 
short term returns in order to receive immediate compensation). 
 51. Supra note 42. 
 52. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.010 (3d ed.  Supp. 2009) (stating that under 
Delaware law, a corporation need not have any particular officers and could give its officers any 
title including czar or potentate). 
 53. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues: The Policy 
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1749 n.1 (2006) (noting 
that Delaware charters 60% of the Fortune 500 firms). 
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framework governing the powers of CEOs is not atypical.  Delaware simply 
vests the power to manage the corporation in the board of directors.54  The 
board may delegate operational authority to any agent it deems fit and may 
give that agent any title it deems appropriate.55  Beyond that cursory legal 
framework, Delaware corporate law does little to delimit CEO power. 
Federal law also governs public firms and provides additional restraint on 
managers, beyond state corporate law.  For example, in 2002, SOX imposed a 
new regime to govern the audit function that diminishes CEO influence.56  
Shortly thereafter, similar mechanisms emerged pursuant to the listing 
requirements of the national securities exchanges, particularly the NYSE and 
the NASDAQ, to enhance the independence of the board generally, and the 
nominating committee and compensation committee in particular.57  These 
listing requirements furnish the SEC a means of influencing corporate 
governance standards because all listing requirements are subject to SEC 
approval.58  This framework reflects the American system of corporate 
federalism that directs corporate governance for public firms.59  The remainder 
of this section will measure the efficacy of this framework against the best 
evidence regarding CEO autonomy. 
Optimizing CEO autonomy requires balancing the risk of excessive agency 
costs against the costs of hamstringing CEO leadership.  Former Federal 
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan served as a director of numerous public 
firms.60  Greenspan admits corporate governance devolved towards CEO 
primacy.61  He recognizes that CEOs enjoy sufficient autonomy to enhance 
 
 54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
. . . shall be managed by or under the supervision of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 55. Id. §142(a) (“Every corporation . . . shall have such officers with such titles and duties as 
shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board . . . .”). 
 56. Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1159, 1170–75 (2005) (detailing enhanced requirements for independent directors and the 
audit committee). 
 57. Id.  See also ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN 
CORPORATION: CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE CONTROL, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 90 
(2006) (“During the last two decades of the twentieth century, some institutional investors and 
corporate governance experts have tried to restrict excessive concentration of powers in 
management by increasing the power of non-executive directors.”). 
 58. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC’s 
Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1180–86 (2007) (discussing the influence of the SEC and stock 
exchanges over corporate governance). 
 59. Id. 
 60. ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 424 
(2007). 
 61. Id. (“[C]orporate governance moved from shareholder control to control by the CEO.”). 
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their own compensation and harm their firms.62  Despite such “obvious 
shortcomings,” Greenspan concludes (“reluctantly”) that “CEO control and the 
authoritarianism it breeds are probably the only way to run an enterprise 
successfully.”63  Greenspan argues that “[a] corporation can have only one 
strategy [and] [c]ompeting ‘independent’ voices . . . undermine the 
effectiveness of the CEO and the rest of the corporate board.”64  Chairman 
Greenspan articulates the central challenge addressed in this Article: The 
optimal contours of CEO autonomy.65 
Despite the lack of any legal requirement for the position of CEO, the 
public firm in the United States evolved toward a uniform approach of 
centralizing all operational authority in the hands of a singular executive 
officer.66  The concept of empowering CEOs to pursue opportunities quickly, 
without first achieving internal consensus, supported allowing dynamic leaders 
greater authority.67  The emergence of the imperial CEO inspired a new norm 
in the boardroom—deference and support displaced real monitoring.68  CEOs 
came to dominate boards by setting the agenda, controlling the flow of 
information, selecting board members, and hiring outside consultants and 
professionals.69  For a period of time in the 1960s, firms with strong CEOs 
seemed to enjoy superior financial performance.70  Such centralized power 
raised concerns regarding agency costs, but “most CEOs” exercised their 
power appropriately, and resisted the temptation to transfer wealth away from 
shareholders for their own benefit.71  Current norms stress that directors should 
not “second guess management” and that a board should “support” the CEO, 
 
 62. Id. at 425 (stating that CEO primacy “spawned abuse”). 
 63. Id. at 428–29. 
 64. Id. at 431. 
 65. Scholars Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira model CEO incentives to share information 
with boards that monitor management with more intensity.  Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A 
Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 217–18 (2007).  They conclude that CEOs may well 
respond to enhanced scrutiny by withholding information from the board that would necessarily 
diminish the value the board may add in its advisory as well as its monitoring capacity.  Id. at 
241–42. 
 66. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 57, at 99–111 (explaining the development of CEOs as 
the central operational authority). 
 67. Id. at 98 (“[T]ransferring more power to part-time independent board members may . . . 
nullify the authority of executives to act quickly and opportunistically in the shareholders’ best 
economic interest.  Boards may deny this authority to competent CEOs while they argue over 
[the] merits of particular actions and consider their personal liabilities.”). 
 68. Id. at 110–11. 
 69. Id. at 111. 
 70. Id. 
 71. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 57, at 111, 113. 
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particularly with respect to operations.72  The Corporate Director’s Guidebook 
(promulgated by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Business Law) suggests that while “directors are 
responsible for overseeing and directing the operation of the business and 
affairs of the corporation, most directors are not managers” and that the 
“challenge for outside directors is to oversee the corporation’s activities 
effectively and make well-informed decisions without themselves usurping the 
role of management.”73  The current best practice for directors appears to be 
managerial deference in terms of operations. 
Naturally, a CEO’s influence on firm performance depends upon sufficient 
power to set the course for the firm.  The proposition that more powerful CEOs 
exert a greater sway over performance enjoys abundant empirical support.74  
Similarly, scholars have demonstrated that the diversification of opinions 
implicit in more diffused group decision-making operates to stabilize returns.75  
Evidence suggests that group decision-making benefits from a diversity 
(cultural, racial, gender, and socioeconomic) of perspectives.76  This evidence 
 
 72. SUSAN F. SHULTZ, THE BOARD BOOK: MAKING YOUR CORPORATE BOARD A 
STRATEGIC FORCE IN YOUR COMPANY’S SUCCESS 158, 162 (2001).  See also RAM CHARAN, 
BOARDS THAT DELIVER: ADVANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FROM COMPLIANCE TO 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 173 (2005) (“The best CEOs are powerful in the good sense of the 
word . . . [and that normally the board’s job is to provide] coaching and support.”); HARVARD 
BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 188–89 (2000) (“Most directors and managers 
seem to agree that the objective is to make the board a more effective watch-dog without 
undermining management’s ability to run the business.”). 
 73. CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK: COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS 2 (5th ed. 
2007).  “The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association’s Section of 
Business Law is composed of active or former practicing lawyers, law professors, regulators, and 
judges, with corporate expertise and from throughout the United States.”  Id. at ix. 
 74. E.g., Renée B. Adams et al., Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate 
Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1403, 1404 (2005) (“We find evidence that stock returns are 
more variable in firms in which the CEO has greater power to influence decisions.”). 
 75. See Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus 
Decentralized Organizations, 106 Q.J. ECON. 289, 290 (1991) (“The overall effect of a greater 
centralization . . . is to induce a greater variability in the economy’s managerial quality.”). 
 76. E.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES  OF POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOES 250 (2d ed. 1982) (undertaking intensive case studies and finding that group 
heterogeneity can stem “groupthink”); David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board 
Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2003) (“[D]iversity produces more effective 
problem solving. While heterogeneity may initially produce more conflict . . . the variety of 
perspectives that emerges cause decision makers to evaluate more alternatives and more carefully 
explore the consequences of these alternatives.”); Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity 
and Creativity in Small Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 252 (1996) (comparing quality and 
feasibility of the ideas of “Anglo” working groups and racially or ethnically diverse groups and 
concluding that culturally diverse workforces create competitive advantage through better 
decisions). 
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extends to diverse boards.77  Indeed, a fundamental justification for the 
existence of a board of directors is the benefit of group decision-making.78  A 
CEO-centric model of corporate decision-making thus benefits from some 
degree of logical support, but is associated with more variable returns as well 
as the loss of any decision-making benefit arising from the inclusion of diverse 
perspectives. 
A CEO-centric model of corporate power also compromises efforts to 
control agency costs.  For example, rational CEOs can be expected to exercise 
the largely unbridled power79 that they enjoy to hand-pick directors to 
maximize expected payoffs.80  One study suggests that powerful CEOs will 
engage in homosocial reproduction in the selection of board members.81  This 
will naturally lead to higher compensation payments to the CEO82 and less 
stringent monitoring.83  As could be expected, research on affinity bias 
demonstrates that the payoffs from homosocial reproduction can be 
 
 77. Carter, supra note 76, at 51 (“After controlling for size, industry and other corporate 
governance measures, we find statistically significant positive relationships between the presence 
of women or minorities on the board and firm value . . . .”). 
 78. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge states, “Because most board tasks entail the exercise of 
critical evaluative judgment . . . corporations are well-served by group decisionmaking at the 
top.”  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 54 (2002). 
 79. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
732 (2007) (“The shareholder franchise is largely a myth.  Shareholders commonly do not have a 
viable power to replace the directors of public companies.  Electoral challenges are rare, and the 
risk of replacement via a proxy contest is extremely low.”). 
 80. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity 
Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 
(2004) (“CEOs play the game of homosocial reproduction when selecting directors.  Given our 
apartheid tradition, this means that the upper echelons of corporate America will be essentially 
the exclusive province of white males far into the future.”) [hereinafter Ramirez, Games CEOs 
Play]. 
 81. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern?: CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77 (1995) (“[When] 
CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to the firm’s 
incumbent CEO . . . .”).  Westphal and Zajac’s study is based upon data from “413 
Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 1986 to 1991.”  Id. at 61.  They define demographic 
diversity in terms of age, educational background, tenure with the organization, and 
insider/outsider status.  Id. at 63–65.  The authors’ premise is that “in-group bias” is “quite 
powerful” even when based upon irrelevant factors.  Id. at 62.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
extend their findings to factors such as race that have powerful social meaning in our society. 
 82. Id. at 79 (“[D]emographic similarity between CEOs and board members was positively 
related to subsequent increases in CEO compensation.”). 
 83. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233, 1240–41 (2003) (arguing that enhanced board diversity reduces the perils of groupthink). 
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significant.84  Another study tends to show that CEOs will use their influence 
to bestow higher pay on directors in order to enhance their own pay prospects 
at the cost of firm performance.85  Despite notable reforms recently, CEOs still 
influence board selections and America’s corporate boards continue to be the 
near exclusive preserve of white males.86  A CEO with power over board 
selection rationally will pursue board members with high affinity to the CEO 
in order to achieve higher compensation and more lax monitoring. 
The conclusion that excessive CEO power leads to suboptimal decision-
making and excessive agency costs seems well supported empirically.87  For 
example, one study focused upon the prevalence of luck-based compensation.88  
The study found that CEO compensation is frequently tied to luck, such as 
CEOs in the oil industry achieving windfall paydays from increases in the 
price of oil—over which they have no control.89  Luck-based compensation, 
however, arose most prominently in firms with weak corporate governance.90  
For instance, pay for luck diminishes significantly in firms with a large 
individual shareholder, who presumably has strong incentive to monitor 
management closely.91  This suggests that compensating CEOs for luck is 
 
 84. See Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: A 
Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 160 (2008) (demonstrating that 
membership in a group creates preference for that group and against other groups, even when 
groups are defined based upon arbitrary and trivial factors). 
 85. Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 402, 404, 421–22 (2006) (finding that 
higher director pay is associated with higher CEO pay and weaker financial performance, 
suggesting cronyism). 
 86. E.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 179 (2007) (“Many boards are 
men’s clubs, in which the members dress the same, have attended the same schools, and represent 
a single social class.  Directors and the boards on which they sit tend to be isolated from what 
goes on in the society that surrounds them.”). 
 87. E.g., Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The 
Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 703–04 (2007) (finding 
that financial misstatements are positively associated with CEOs that also chair the board, as well 
as CEOs that hold substantial amounts of in-the-money options). 
 88. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck?  The Ones 
Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901, 901–02 (2001) (“Simple models of the contracting 
view generate one important prediction. Shareholders will not reward CEOs for observable luck. 
By luck, we mean changes in firm performance that are beyond the CEO’s control.  Tying pay to 
luck, therefore, cannot provide better incentives and will only make the contract riskier.”). 
 89. Id. at 914 (“[T]he average firm rewards its CEO as much for luck as it does for a general 
movement in performance.”).  The study relied upon data on 792 firms from 1984 to 1991.  Id. at 
910. 
 90. Id. at 929. 
 91. Id. at 921, 929 (“Adding a large shareholder on the board, for example, decreased the 
pay for luck by 23 to 33 percent.”). 
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suboptimal and that it is possible to filter out such pay.92  It also suggests that if 
CEOs have sufficient power, they will subvert the compensation setting 
process by using that power to skim profits from shareholders.93 
Another study assessed CEO centrality (defined by the CEO’s share of 
aggregate compensation paid to a firm’s top five executives) on firm 
performance and certain negative behavioral and performance markers.94  The 
study concluded that CEO power is associated with lower firm value, negative 
market reactions to acquisition announcements, more luck-based 
compensation, and less CEO turnover, among other things.95  This is consistent 
with evidence that award-winning CEOs use their enhanced stature to garner 
higher compensation while underperforming financially.96  Other studies 
suggest that firm performance may be enhanced by limitations upon CEO 
autonomy.97  It appears that the current corporate governance framework 
permits too much CEO autonomy.98  Thus, in general, the concept of enhanced 
board monitoring to reduce CEO autonomy appears promising.99  These 
 
 92. Id. at 929. 
 93. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 88, at 929. 
 94. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., CEO Centrality 1, 7 (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 601, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1030107 (CEO pay slice is computed using a sample data period of 1993–2004). 
 95. Id. at 34.  The authors recognize the possibility that high CEO centrality could be 
optimal for low-value firms.  Id. at 23, 34.  Nevertheless, some of the other firm aspects tested are 
likely correlated to suboptimal decision-making, strengthening the inference that the correlation 
between high centrality and low firm value is the result of governance problems and agency costs.  
Id.  Further, it is unclear why low firm value would be correlated to high CEO centrality.  See id. 
at 34. 
 96. See James B. Wade et al., Star CEOs: Benefit or Burden?, 37 ORG. DYNAMICS 203, 207 
(2008) (finding that after earning awards, CEOs garnered higher compensation but that firm value 
decreased 240 days after the award announcement). 
 97. Augustin Landier et al., Bottom-Up Corporate Governance 22 (May 21, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~sraer/bottomup.pdf 
(finding that firms with more independent officers—those not selected by the CEO—below the 
CEO, achieve higher financial performance). 
 98. A key element of the corporate governance framework which operates to entrench 
managers and encourage suboptimal conduct is state antitakeover legislation.  Marianne Bertrand 
& Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1046–47 (2003).  The evidence suggests that these statutes 
allow CEOs to raise the wages paid to employees at the expense of more remote shareholders.  Id. 
at 1072 (finding higher wages for workers following antitakeover statutes, but suggesting that 
these did not lead to higher productivity). 
 99. See Ivan E. Brick & N. K. Chidambaran, Board Meetings, Committee Structure, and 
Firm Performance 35 (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108241 (“While we do note some positive effects of board 
monitoring on firm value, it is evident only in some of our regression specifications. We interpret 
our results to imply that firms are in equilibrium with respect to the level of board monitoring and 
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studies lend further support to the position that CEOs possess sufficient 
autonomy to enhance their compensation at the expense of their shareholders. 
Excessive CEO autonomy also seems to distort certain elements of 
corporate behavior.  Those companies that issue guidance regarding earnings, 
for example, are more likely to engage in myopic behavior.100  Specifically, 
such firms will manage their earnings in various ways such as reducing 
research and development expenses to pump-up current earnings.101  This 
earning management impairs long-term performance.102  CEOs apparently 
meet their guidance through a variety of earnings management techniques that 
harm long term financial performance.103  A similar dynamic pertains to high-
cost acquisitions of other firms.104  Apparently, “overconfident, very powerful, 
[or] very greedy”105 CEOs will overpay for acquisitions in order to enhance 
their power, prestige, and, ultimately, their compensation.106  CEO hubris 
associated with both harmful earnings management107 as well as excessive 
payments for acquisitions108 suggests that these areas are in need of diminished 
CEO autonomy.  And more vigilant boards do, in fact, reduce the ability of 
CEOs to undertake acquisitions that harm shareholder wealth.109 
 
that the intense focus of political and regulatory attention has to some degree served to make 
boards more sensitive to firm performance and add to shareholder value.”). 
 100. Mei Cheng et al., Earnings Guidance and Managerial Myopia 29 (Nov. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
851545.  This study involved a sample of 989 companies across ten industries from 2001 to 2003.  
Id. at 11. 
 101. Id. at 29 (“[W]e document that dedicated guiders invest less in R&D . . . and have 
significantly lower [return on assets] growth than occasional guiders.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Katherine Gunny, The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities 
Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks, 4 (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
816025&rec=1&srcabs=928182# (“[A]fter controlling for size, performance, level of accruals, 
industry and managerial intent real earnings management is associated with significantly lower 
future earnings and cash flows.”). 
 104. E.g., Matthew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid 
for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 103 (1997) (finding that 
CEO hubris and power are associated with higher acquisition premiums). 
 105. Id. at 124. 
 106. See SMITH  & WALTER, supra note 57, at 112–13. 
 107. Paul Hribar & Holly Yang, CEO Confidence, Management Earnings Forecasts, and 
Earnings Management 1 (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929731&rec=1&srcabs=817108 (“Taken together, our 
results suggest that overconfidence increases the optimistic bias in voluntary forecasts, leading to 
both a greater likelihood of missing management forecasts and increasing earnings management 
among firms issue management forecasts.”). 
 108. Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 104, at 123–24. 
 109. See id. at 124. 
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Compensation in particular raises concerns regarding excessive CEO 
autonomy.110  The concerns regarding CEOs incurring too much risk in order 
to maximize short-term payoffs during the subprime lending frenzy seem 
valid.111  “CEOs who derived [a high level] of their pay from stock options 
generated more big losses than big gains . . . . and their ratio of big losses to 
big gains [exceeded] the corresponding ratios for CEOs who derived less of 
their pay from stock options.”112  The essential problem arising from options 
compensation is that CEOs benefit from upside moves in stock prices, but have 
zero exposure to downside price moves;113 naturally, a CEO facing such 
incentive-based compensation will seek higher returns regardless of risk.114  
CEO autonomy over compensation practices transmogrified into the 
nefarious115 options backdating scandals that came to light in 2006 through 
academic research that strongly suggested wrongdoing on a systemic basis.116  
This further demonstrates that CEOs too often manipulate the system of 
compensation to garner excessive payments, or worse.117 
 
 110. E.g., Harley E. Ryan Jr. & Roy A. Wiggins III, Who Is in Whose Pocket? Director 
Compensation, Board Independence, and Barriers to Effective Monitoring, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 497, 
499 (2004) (“[P]owerful managers use their positions to influence the directors’ compensation to 
provide fewer incentives to monitor and simultaneously make their own compensation less 
sensitive to stock performance.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The 
Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
1055, 1076 (2007) (finding that CEOs will undertake excessive risks in order to maximize 
payoffs from stock option incentive compensation). 
 112. Id. at 1073. 
 113. SMITH  & WALTER, supra note 57, at 114 (noting risks of options compensation arising 
from moral hazards facing CEOs whereby they benefit from profits but are not exposed to risks of 
loss). 
 114. Sanders & Hambrick, supra note 111, at 1076.  See also Matt Bloom & George T. 
Milkovich, Relationships Among Risk, Incentive Pay and Organizational Performance, 41 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 283, 292 (1998) (finding higher risk firms that relied upon incentive pay such as stock 
options performed worse than firms that did not rely on such compensation). 
 115. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More Companies Show 
Questionable Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A1 (“It is stealing, in effect. It is 
ripping off shareholders in an unconscionable way.”) (quoting former SEC chair Arthur Levitt).  
The options backdating scandal involved the use of fabricated documents so the managers could 
take advantage of lower stock prices when they exercised their right to buy shares.  Id. at A10. 
 116. “We . . . estimate that 29.2% of firms at some point engaged in manipulation of grants to 
top executives between 1996 and 2005.”  Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock 
Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 
524 (2009). 
 117. See Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report for 2002: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (stating that lax boards 
had contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power structure that permitted senior executives to 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1 
Overall, empirical scholarship gives scanty clue regarding the optimal 
contours of CEO autonomy, at least with any degree of precision.  It seems, 
though, that a strong case can be made that the present system of corporate 
governance fails to appropriately curb CEO power.118  In general, reduced 
CEO power within an organization increases financial performance or firm 
value.119  But the incomplete nature of the record counsels caution.  Strong 
CEOs can potentially have a positive influence on firm performance.120  While 
noted business leaders contest the notion of the CEO as firm savior or strategic 
visionary, stifling CEO autonomy may lower agency costs only at the cost of 
managerial excellence.121  Corporate governance must search for the optimal 
balance between the containment of agency costs and the empowerment of 
CEOs to maximize profits.122 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of academic analysis on this seemingly 
basic point.  But the question of appropriate CEO autonomy animates the basic 
reforms embodied in SOX.  SOX focused primarily on limiting the ability of 
the CEO to subvert or manipulate the audit function.123  SOX mandated 
independent audit committees.124  It provided that auditors for public firms 
report to and be accountable to the independent audit committee.125  SOX 
provided a specific, if modest, definition of “independent.”126  Finally, public 
firms must have one audit committee member with specific accounting 
 
“harvest” gains through manipulation of share prices) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm. 
 118. See SMITH & WALTER, supra note 57, at 113–16 (describing the incentives for CEO 
misbehavior within the current system). 
 119. See Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law, supra note 12, at 337.  In 2007, I 
surveyed much of the empirical evidence addressing optimal corporate governance, generally, 
and concluded that: “The current system of corporate governance law looks nothing like 
emerging corporate governance science” and that CEOs exercised far too much power.  Id. at 
346–47. 
 120. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 57, at 99–112. 
 121. See generally RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE 
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISTMATIC CEOS (2002). 
 122. See Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law, supra note 112, at 316 n.23 
(“Optimal corporate governance would consist of those laws, regulations, disclosure 
requirements, and contractual provisions that would serve to maximize benefits from the 
alignment of interests between investors and managers net of compliance, regulatory, and other 
transaction costs. Thus, optimal corporate governance would minimize net agency costs.” (citing 
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1142, 1160–61 (2005))). 
 123. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006). 
 124. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A). 
 125. Id. §§ 78j-1(k), (m)(2). 
 126. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B). 
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expertise (or an explanation regarding the lack of financial expertise).127  All of 
this effectively stripped the CEO of autonomy over the audit function. 
These SOX reforms seem successful, and independent audit committees 
are frequently associated with a lower cost of capital.128  Business scholars 
suggest the SOX approach (as refined by SEC regulations) is “optimal” 
because it allows firms flexibility in defining the precise contours of the audit 
committee.129  The reforms operate to enhance the quality of audits.130  This is 
consistent with evidence showing that the market valued the SOX audit 
reforms and, since 2002, there has been less improper earnings management.131  
Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis, 
audit failure has not materially contributed to the subprime crisis.132  Taken 
together, these reforms appear to have enhanced the operation of corporate 
governance. 
The empirical evidence suggests that curbing CEO autonomy over 
ancillary corporate functions—those functions more central to monitoring than 
business strategizing—is appropriate.  The audit function, for instance, is a 
check on the performance of the CEO, and CEO domination of this function is 
difficult to justify.  The CEO should not be permitted to control the production 
of financial statements as they are fundamentally a report on the performance 
of management.  Moreover, an independent audit function does not impair the 
ability of the CEO to pursue any strategic vision the CEO may have.  An 
independent audit function does not interfere with operational control.  The 
empirical record regarding the efficacy of the SOX audit reforms thus appears 
to enjoy a sound basis in reason. 
 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006).  The SEC promulgated regulations implementing this section.  
17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 249 (2008). 
 128. E.g., Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and 
the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 340 (2004) (finding that independent audit 
committees are associated with a lower cost of debt). 
 129. Joseph V. Carcello et al., Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management 32–33 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887512 (finding 
that independent audit committee members facilitate higher quality audits). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Daniel A. Cohen et al., Trends in Earnings Management and Informativeness of 
Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods 30 (Feb. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
658782 (finding less improper earnings management after SOX). 
 132. See, e.g., Donald Nordberg, Waste Makes Haste: Sarbanes-Oxley, Competitiveness and 
the Subprime Crisis 21–23 (May 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1131674 (arguing that SOX posed an opportunity to 
reform corporate governance but not attributing any part of the subprime crisis to the SOX audit 
reforms). 
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The foregoing suggests that CEO autonomy should be limited to the 
freedom necessary to secure the unified leadership of the firm and the pursuit 
of a unified business strategy.  The CEO should not have autonomy to harm 
the corporation through the subversion of the business monitoring function, the 
audit function, or the legal compliance function.  Normatively, these functions 
are best secured without strong CEO autonomy.  They only tangentially bear 
upon the core business mission of the firm, and the CEO is not inherently 
optimal institutionally to manage these functions.  The next part of this Article 
summarizes the functioning of the American system of corporate governance 
for public firms in the specific context of the subprime fiasco.  Testing 
corporate governance in that context supplements the empirical learning 
reviewed in this section by subjecting that evidence to a stress test. 
II.  CEO AUTONOMY AND THE SUBPRIME FIASCO 
Perhaps the prime lesson of the subprime fiasco is that corporate 
governance law must be able to withstand exogenous shocks.133  As previously 
stated, the subprime crisis arose from many complex factors far removed from 
corporate governance.134  For example, the frenzy of subprime mortgage 
lending had its roots in an extended period of expansionary monetary policy 
beginning after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the dot-com bust.135  
Deregulation in the financial sector, ranging from subprime lending practices 
to the degree of leverage permissible in the investment banking industry, 
exacerbated the effects of this easy money.136  Even the structure of 
globalization contributed to the flow of cheap capital to fund consumption in 
 
 133. The costs of a breakdown in corporate governance for public firms can now be measured 
in the trillions. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 57, at 19.  Thus, even a one percent chance of a 
major breakdown must be comprehended within any policy calculus regarding the risks of lax 
corporate governance.  I have argued previously that the more demanding system of corporate 
governance prevailing from 1934 to 1987 supported durable stability for at least six decades.  See 
Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor 
Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 60 n.168, 60–63 (2002) (arguing that the radical deregulation 
of director duties in the 1980s combined with the evisceration of private securities litigation in the 
1990s permitted management and associated professionals to harvest excessive compensation 
while shareholders lost billions). 
 134. E.g., MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT 
BAILOUTS—HOW WE GOT HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO FIX IT 2 (updated ed. 2009) 
(“There’s plenty of blame to go around.”). 
 135. Id. at 3. 
 136. Id. at 4, 13.  See also Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, 
and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1 (recounting suspension of net capital rule for 
investment banks that allowed Bear Stearns to leverage its debt to equity ratio to 33 to 1). 
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general and the housing market in particular.137  Under these circumstances, a 
predictable mania fueled by debt took hold in financial firms. 
Corporate governance did not respond well to these macroeconomic 
challenges.138  Such challenges are far more frequent than corporate scholars 
generally assume.139  As economist Hyman Minsky contended, “Periods of 
stability (or of tranquility) of a modern capitalist economy are transitory.”140  
At the heart of this fundamental and permanent instability is the financing and 
investment function.141  The corporation is central to this process because its 
infinite life permits matching assets with revenues generated from those assets 
over long periods of time, which, in turn, facilitates the financing of such 
assets.142  And, as Minsky states, “[B]y and large, business corporations 
control capital assets and order investment output, the financial powers and 
practices of corporations are the starting points for policies to manage or 
contain instability.”143  The assessment of corporate governance, therefore, 
must be reconceived from its functioning under static or stable conditions to 
comprehend its performance under conditions of financial strain, stress, and 
instability.144  The baseline assessment must assume conditions of instability, 
 
 137. ZANDI, supra note 134, at 3, 10.  See also Mark Landler, Dollar Shift: Chinese Pockets 
Filled as Americans’ Emptied, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, at A1 (“In the past decade, China has 
invested upward of $1 trillion, mostly earnings from manufacturing exports, into American 
government bonds and government-backed mortgage debt. That has lowered interest rates and 
helped fuel a historic consumption binge and housing bubble in the United States.”). 
 138. Alan Greenspan’s famous admission of error, made as part of his congressional 
testimony, supports the thesis of this article that CEOs enjoy too much autonomy to harm their 
firms and line their own pockets: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of 
organizations, specifically banks and others, were such . . . that they were best capable of 
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”  The Financial Crisis and the 
Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Oversight and Government Reform, 
110th Cong. 33 (2008) (preliminary transcript of testimony of Alan Greenspan), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081024163819.pdf. 
 139. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES 220–21 (4th ed. 2000) (“Dismissing financial crisis on the grounds that 
bubbles and bust cannot take place because that would imply irrationality is to ignore a condition 
for the sake of a theory.”). 
 140. HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, at ix (2008). 
 141. Id. at 327 (“[T]he inherent instability of capitalism is due to the way profits depend upon 
investment . . . and investment depends upon the availability of external financing.  But the 
availability of financing presupposes that prior debts and the prices that were paid for capital 
assets are being validated by profits.”). 
 142. Id. at 351–52 (“The corporation is a social instrument that is best suited to hold and 
operate expensive special-purpose capital assets whose expected life as an earner of quasi-rents is 
long.”). 
 143. Id. at 349. 
 144. Minsky recognized that monetary and fiscal measures enabled the United States to avoid 
a repeat of the Great Depression.  Id. at 328.  He also maintained, however, that financial 
innovation coupled with a return of laissez-faire regulation could ignite a debt-deflation driven 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
22 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1 
and even comprehend severe financial crises, such as the subprime mortgage 
fiasco. 
An overview of the history of corporate governance scholarship 
demonstrates that few authors contemplate such stress-testing.145  Prior to the 
1990s, most financial and economics scholars assumed that corporate 
governance must be optimal, having evolved under Darwinian market 
conditions and standing the test of time.146  Today many scholars test various 
elements of corporate governance against financial or economic performance, 
permitting innovative insights into an optimal corporate governance regime.147  
The sample periods used for these empirical assessments generally are too 
short to permit any sort of stress test, and, in any event, are too frequently 
based upon periods of stability and prosperity.148  This necessarily means that 
the extant scholarship testing for optimal corporate governance (or by 
extension appropriate levels of CEO autonomy) does not comprehend the 
complex of challenges leading up to the subprime fiasco or the macroeconomic 
wake left by the subprime debacle. 
 
depression.  Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable Economy: Two Decades 
Later in HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, at xvii–xviii (2008). 
 145. Recently apologists for the CEO-centric model of corporate governance took easy 
comfort in a study linking increased CEO pay to increases in market capitalization, as if the CEO 
alone among employees was inherently entitled to riskless equity returns.  See Xavier Gabaix & 
Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008)  (“The 
sixfold increase in CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be attributed to the sixfold increase in 
market capitalization of large U.S. companies during that period.”).  Of course, recently stock 
market prices have collapsed; there is little indication that CEO compensation is poised to suffer a 
similar collapse.  See Lynn Thomasson,  Morgan Stanley Says S&P 500 to Drop 25%, Cuts 
Outlook, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060110 
3&sid=aUX5fDy9mtbQ&refer=us (noting that U.S. equities have fallen 52% in 17 months and 
that some analysts predict another 25% drop). 
 146. See, e.g., Stacey Kole & Kenneth Lehn, Deregulation, the Evolution of Corporate 
Governance Structure, and Survival, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 421 (1997) (stating that, as of 
1997, “[m]uch of the literature on corporate governance” took a “Darwinian view” in that 
surviving firms are presumed to have optimal governance structures leading to an absence of 
evidence regarding optimal governance structures). 
 147. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 783 (2009) (concluding that managerial entrenchment is negatively correlated with firm 
performance and stock returns); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 108–11 (2003).  Superior corporate governance is associated with higher 
market valuations and using an index of corporate governance consisting of twenty-four factors of 
corporate governance.  The authors broke these factors down into five groups: (i) factors 
associated with delaying hostile threats to corporate control; (ii) factors associated with voting 
rights; (iii) factors designed to protect officers and directors from liability or termination; (iv) 
other anti-takeover protections; and (v) state laws bearing upon takeovers.  Id. at 111. 
 148. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409 (2006) (finding that correlation between certain 
corporate governance elements as of February 1, 2003 and performance in 2002). 
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Yet, by any reasonable assessment, the U.S. system of corporate 
governance allowed agency costs to run amok during the relevant time period 
associated with the subprime crisis, and allowed CEO misconduct in particular 
to destroy firms and crash the global economy.149  The International Monetary 
Fund assessed the magnitude of the subprime mortgage crisis and identified the 
subprime classes of 2006 and 2007 as the most problematic in terms of 
delinquency rates; in fact, within months of origination, loans from the class of 
2006 suffered a delinquency rate of over 35%, and the class of 2007 outpaced 
the class of 2006.150 
The following five firms were very active in the subprime mortgage sector 
during those problematic years: Countrywide Financial;151 Citigroup;152 Merrill 
 
 149. Finance Professor James Bicksler conducted a partial review of empirical reality in terms 
of the link between corporate governance and the subprime fiasco: “In sum, these executive 
compensation payments were big time wealth transfers from the common shareholders of 
Countrywide Financial, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch to the CEOs of these respective 
companies.” James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to Corporate 
Governance, 5 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOV. 295, 297 (2008) (showing that corporate governance 
failed to assure that CEO compensation was even “remotely” linked to performance).  Professor 
Bicksler argues that his sample of Countrywide, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch reflects a broader 
problem: “a seemingly large disconnect between actual corporate performance and corporate 
executive compensation” that infected a number of mortgage firms, and that plagues American 
corporate governance generally.  Id. at 298. 
 150. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL 
STRESS AND DELEVERATING 12 fig.1.8 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
 151. Countrywide originated over $57 billion in subprime mortgages in 2006 and 2007.  I 
INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL 
ANNUAL 12 (2008).  It serviced in excess of $231 billion in subprime mortgages. Id. at 241.  In 
addition, it packaged for resale (as underwriter or issuer) to investors in excess of $106 billion in 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) consisting of subprime mortgage pools.  II INSIDE MORTGAGE 
FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL  149–50 
(2008).   Countrywide was the nation’s largest mortgage lender.  Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the 
Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at BU1. 
 152. Citigroup sold at least $63 billion in subprime backed MBS as issuer or underwriter 
between 2005 and 2007.  II INSIDE MORTGAGE, supra note 151, at 149–50.  As will be discussed 
below, on November 4, 2007, Citigroup announced it had $55 billion in subprime exposure that 
resulted in significant losses.  Press Release, Citigroup, Citi’s Sub-Prime Related Exposure in 
Securities and Banking (Nov. 4, 2007), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/ 
071104b.htm.  Much of this exposure arose from Citigroup’s sales of mortgage pools for fees, but 
which included a provision that allowed buyers to resell them to Citigroup if liquidity for the 
instruments dried up—these were hence termed “liquidity puts” and they were not disclosed to 
Citigroup’s shareholders until November 4, 2007.  Floyd Norris, Bank Profits Had Whiff of 
Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at C1.  Before the subprime meltdown, Citigroup was the 
nation’s largest bank.  Jonathan Stemple, J.P. Morgan Passes Citigroup as Largest U.S. Bank, 
REUTERS, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE49F45Q0081016. 
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Lynch;153 AIG;154 and Washington Mutual.155  Combined, these firms bear 
significant responsibility for the subprime fiasco.  Each of these firms was 
subject to different regulatory regimes.  All were publicly held, and their 
shareholders absorbed massive losses as a result of subprime exposure. 
Countrywide Financial originated, serviced, and packaged more subprime 
loans than any other firm.156  And throughout, Countrywide was engaged in 
reprehensible lending practices.  In fact, Countrywide ultimately settled 
allegations of predatory lending asserted by eleven states for over $8 billion—
the largest such settlement in history.157  The states alleged that Countrywide 
lied about its “no closing cost loans,” misled consumers with respect to hidden 
fees, structured loans with risky features, paid brokers more to sell more risky 
loans, and frequently lent based upon inflated borrowers’ income (without 
borrower involvement).158  The New York Times interviewed former 
employees159 who corroborated (and documented) many of these allegations.160  
The profits generated through lax lending standards and high fees were so 
 
 153. Merrill Lynch securitized $95 billion in subprime mortgages through 2006 and 2007.  II 
INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, supra note 151, at 149–50. 
 154. AIG invested “hundreds of billions in mortgage-related assets.”  In addition, AIG was a 
key player in the credit default swap market and guaranteed an unknown amount of unknown 
obligations.  AIG also invested heavily in hedge funds.  Thus, its “collapse would be as close to 
an extinction–level event as the financial markets have seen since the Great Depression.”  
Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A29.  Among the 
obligations AIG guaranteed were $80 billion in mortgage securities, including subprime 
mortgages.  Carol J. Loomis, AIG: The Company that Came to Dinner, FORTUNE, Jan. 19, 2009, 
at 76.  When those securities defaulted, AIG was downgraded by the credit rating agencies, a 
move that ultimately led to a run on the financial conglomerate that once was the world’s largest 
insurance company.  Id. 
 155. WaMu originated $32 billion in subprime mortgages in 2006 and 2007.  INSIDE 
MORTGAGE FINANCE, supra note 151, at 215.  It securitized nearly $35 billion. II INSIDE 
MORTGAGE FINANCE, supra note 151, at 149–50 (noting that WAMu was once the nation’s 
largest savings and loan, also known as a thrift). 
 156. David Olive, Corporate Rewards for Failure, THESTAR.COM, Feb. 1, 2008, 
http://www.thestar.com/columnists/article/299415 (reporting that Countrywide CEO sold $400 
million in stock between 2005 and 2008). 
 157. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2008, at BU1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Morgenson, supra note 151, at BU8 (“Such loans were made, former employees say, 
because they were so lucrative—to Countrywide. The company harvested a steady stream of fees 
or payments on such loans and busily repackaged them as securities to sell to investors.”). 
 160. Id. (“One document, for instance, shows that until last September the computer system in 
the company’s subprime unit excluded borrowers’ cash reserves, which had the effect of steering 
them away from lower-cost loans to those that were more expensive to homeowners and more 
profitable to Countrywide.”). 
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substantial that Countrywide continued its reckless lending,161 even after 
delinquency rates soared.162  Accordingly, as the Times noted, “the company is 
Exhibit A for the lax and, until recently, highly lucrative lending that has 
turned a once-hot business ice-cold and has touched off a housing crisis of 
historic proportions.”163 
Anthony Mozilo, Countrywide’s CEO, garnered outrageous compensation 
for leading the firm into the subprime pit.164  In 2006, Mozilo’s compensation 
amounted to $102 million, which included a bonus of $20.5 million for 
increasing earnings at Countrywide from $4.11 per share in 2005 to $4.62 per 
share.165  In 2007, Mozilo exercised stock options, hauling in $127 million, just 
prior to the July 24, 2007 announcement that Countrywide would write down 
$388 million in loan losses.166  That year, Mozilo earned an additional $102 
million in salary and $30 million in options compensation.167  He retired in 
2008 with a $58 million benefit package.168  But during 2007, Countrywide 
lost $704 million, as 33% of its subprime mortgages were found to be 
delinquent.169 Shareholders lost over 80% of the value of their shares relative 
to their value before the credit crisis.170  Ultimately, as their fortunes tumbled, 
Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America—where its subprime portfolio 
inflicted $33 billion in additional loan losses.171 
Back in 2007, Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince recognized that if liquidity 
dried up “things will be complicated,” but decided “as long as the music is 
playing you’ve got to get up and dance.”172  Citigroup worked to keep the 
 
 161. Id. (“The company would lend even if the borrower had been 90 days late on a current 
mortgage payment twice in the last 12 months, if the borrower had filed for personal bankruptcy 
protection, or if the borrower had faced foreclosure or default notices on his or her property.”). 
 162. Id. (“One reason these loans were so lucrative for Countrywide is that investors who 
bought securities backed by the mortgages were willing to pay more for loans with prepayment 
penalties and those whose interest rates were going to reset at higher levels.”). 
 163. Morgenson, supra note 151, at BU8 (“[T]he profit margins Countrywide generated on 
subprime loans that it sold to investors were 1.84 percent, versus 1.07 percent on prime loans. A 
year earlier, when the subprime machine was really cranking, sales of these mortgages produced 
profits of 2 percent, versus 0.82 percent from prime mortgages.”). 
 164. Olive, supra note 156. 
 165. Bicksler, supra note 149, at 296. 
 166. Id. at 296–97. 
 167. Id. at 297. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Roddy Boyd, Countrywide: From Bad to Worse, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 8, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/29/news/companies/boyd_countrywide.fortune/. 
 170. Bank of America and Countrywide: Fingers Crossed, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, at 82. 
 171. Bank of America Faces Lingering Financial Woes from Countrywide: Report, 
MARKETWATCH, Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/bank-america-faces-
lingering-financial/story.aspx. 
 172. David Wighton, Prince of Wisdom, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ 
0/fce88e10-8b12-11dc-95f7-0000779fd2ac.html. 
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music playing by including “liquidity puts” in its securitized pools of subprime 
mortgages it sold to investors.173  The liquidity puts required Citigroup to 
repurchase interests in subprime mortgages if the bank ran into any financial 
turbulence.174  Thus, when the road became rough in late 2007, Citigroup 
publicly disclosed for the first time that it had $55 billion in subprime 
mortgage exposure and anticipated losses between $8 billion to $11 billion.175  
Prince resigned shortly thereafter.176  In December of 2007, Citigroup 
announced it would assume $58 billion of debts that had been carried by 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) it had sponsored—the SIVs had invested 
in long term assets (including mortgage related assets) with short term 
funding.177  The risks of these losses went undisclosed to shareholders.178 
Ultimately, the U.S. government was forced to bail out Citigroup, injecting 
$45 billion in capital and guaranteeing $306 billion in asset values.179  During 
2007, Citigroup’s shareholders had lost 45% of their value.180  Its stock traded 
at $55 per share in 2006, and in early 2009 it traded at less than $4 per share.181  
Recently, Citigroup shares have traded at below $1 per share.182  CEO Chuck 
Prince fared much better: his compensation amounted to $66.8 million over his 
last three years, and he was paid a “bonus” of $10.4 million for his last ten 
months of work, which were marked by staggering losses.183  He exited 
Citigroup with $40 million in severance pay.184 
Shareholders attempted to hold management responsible for the billions in 
losses and for the excessive compensation paid to CEO Prince in a derivative 
 
 173. Carol J. Loomis, Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, 
at 69. 
 174. Id. 
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 177. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup Rescues SIVs With $58 Billion 
Debt Bailout (Update1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
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 184. Bicksler, supra note 149, at 297. 
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action.185  Citigroup, however, had inserted an exculpatory provision into its 
charter which effectively allowed management to insulate itself from liability 
for violation of the duty of care under Delaware law.186  Moreover, the court 
stated that “bad faith is a necessary condition to director oversight liability.”187  
Further, the court applied Delaware precedent to find that a board is permitted 
the protection of the business judgment rule to assure the firm does not sue 
them derivatively.188  With respect to claims regarding the excessive 
compensation paid to CEO Prince, the court permitted this claim to proceed.189  
But history suggests that such a claim is not promising.190  Merrill Lynch CEO 
Stanley O’Neal garnered $91 million in compensation for 2006, a year in 
which Merrill reported record earnings.191  In October 2007, when Merrill 
recognized $14.1 billion in subprime losses, O’Neal retired.192  His severance 
package totaled $160 million.193  According to the allegations of securities 
fraud claims asserted by Merrill’s shareholders, 2006 also marked the 
beginning of a multiyear effort by management to mislead investors about the 
nature and magnitude of Merrill’s subprime mortgage exposure.194  On January 
16, 2009, Merrill Lynch announced it had reached an agreement with the 
shareholders’ counsel to settle such claims for $550 million.195 
Merrill Lynch also worked hard to keep the music playing, and when 
customers stopped buying securities backed by subprime mortgages, Merrill 
 
 185. In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 
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not likely to enforce sound corporate governance standards through money damages). 
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 193. Id. 
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14 SEC. REG. & LITIG. REP. 19 (2009), available at http://news.findlaw.com/andrews/bf/scl/ 
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http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65100/000095012309000815/y74071e8vk.htm. 
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purchased billions of dollars in its own products, which customers did not 
want—particularly collateralized debt obligation (CDOs) based upon subprime 
mortgages.196  The probable reason: “Merrill became addicted to the fees that 
flowed from financing CDOs, which reached $700 million in 2006.”197  Merrill 
lost $27.61 billion in 2008, and was taken over by Bank of America, which 
received $45 billion in government bailout funds as well as asset guarantees of 
$118 billion.198  Merrill shareholders lost $30 billion between the date of the 
announced Bank of America takeover and the closing of the merger.199  
Moreover, Merrill Lynch racked up nearly $40 billion in losses in its last few 
quarters.200 
American International Group, or AIG, once the world’s largest insurance 
company, apparently lost more than any other firm.201  On March 2, 2009, AIG 
announced the largest quarterly loss in all of corporate history, totaling $61.7 
billion.202  AIG was subject to a patchwork of regulatory regimes, ranging 
from the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),203 to the New York State 
Department of Insurance, and various other international and domestic 
agencies.204  The AIG Financial Products unit, which caused the catastrophic 
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and Implications for Future Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinafter OTS Statement] (statement of Scott M. 
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losses, was unregulated—but was backed by the full credit and guarantee of 
the parent company.205  Fed chairman Ben Bernanke maintains that AIG 
“exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system” and operated as an unregulated 
hedge fund that “made huge numbers of irresponsible bets.”206  Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner concurred, calling AIG a hedge fund that grew 
“without any adult supervision.”207  The Treasury Secretary and the Fed 
chairman speak with particular authority since they engineered the bailout of 
AIG, which left the United States as the owner of nearly 80% of the firm.208 
AIG’s losses arise from credit default swaps (CDS), whereby the firm 
assumed the risk of loss on pools of subprime related securities.209  Essentially, 
the firm acted as credit insurer; yet, the credit default swaps were not 
insurance, and AIG assumed these risks through an unregulated subsidiary, 
meaning it did not have to reserve fully against future losses nor carry any 
capital to fund potential losses.210  The fees generated from the credit default 
swaps were consequently free income with little associated expense.211  AIG 
literally gambled its viability away in the name of short-term profits.212  When 
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and Means, 111th Cong., 3 (2009) (statement Timothy Geithner, secretary, U.S. Treasury), 
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 208. Joint Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. 
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 209. See Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at 
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 210. See id. 
 211. Stephen Taub, New York: Credit-Default Swaps=Insurance, CFO.COM, Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12285201.  Ironically, shortly after AIG’s federal bailout, New 
York determined that credit default swaps would be regulated as if they were contracts of 
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 212. See Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2009, at BU1, BU2.  AIG obligated itself to assume up to $440 billion in credit default 
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the market for subprime securities crashed, AIG absorbed huge losses in the 
form of obligations to subprime investors.213  The short-term profits were used 
to fund a $600 million bonus pool for the officers in charge of the unit that 
underwrote the credit default swaps.214  The CEO who managed AIG into this 
subprime mess was paid $47 million in severance pay when discharged.215  
The U.S. government effectively seized control in late 2008, at a cost of 
billions to U.S. taxpayers.216 
The essential problem at AIG involves a failure of risk management.  The 
firm’s management simply concluded that the risks of ever being obligated to 
pay under the credit default swap agreements were so remote that little risk 
management was needed.  AIG never hedged its exposure to credit default 
swaps, and only limited its exposure after it had entered into hundreds of 
billions in agreements.217  The OTS leveled criticisms regarding “risk 
management, corporate oversight, and financial reporting, culminating in [a] 
Supervisory Letter issued by OTS in March 2008, which downgraded AIG’s 
examination rating.”218  The firm’s auditors found similar problems and alerted 
the firm to material weaknesses in risk management.219  In particular, the firm 
suffered from severe liquidity risk and was unable to meet collateral calls in 
accordance with the CDS agreements;220 in fact, the OTS “in hindsight” now 
maintains that if the liquidity risks of the CDS agreements had been properly 
assessed, AIG would have been ordered to reduce its CDS exposure.221  This 
risk mismanagement cost shareholders dearly: the shares of AIG traded as high 
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as $70 per share in 2007, and, as of its latest bailout, the shares traded for less 
than $2.222 
Washington Mutual (WaMu) was the nation’s largest thrift, until it became 
the nation’s largest bank failure.223  Four elements of Washington Mutual’s 
business epitomized reckless lending: First, “WaMu gave mortgage brokers 
handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, which carried higher fees, 
bolstering profits and ultimately the compensation of the bank’s executives;” 
second, “WaMu pressed sales agents to pump out loans while disregarding 
borrowers’ incomes and assets;” third, “The bank set up what insiders 
described as a system of dubious legality that enabled real estate agents to 
collect fees of more than $10,000 for bringing in borrowers, sometimes making 
the agents more beholden to WaMu than they were to their clients;” and fourth, 
“WaMu pressured appraisers to provide inflated property values that made 
loans appear less risky, enabling Wall Street to bundle them more easily for 
sale to investors.”224 It suffered mortgage-related losses in excess of $11 
billion in 2008.225  Washington Mutual’s CEO received a total of $88 million 
in pay between 2001 and 2007.226  Yet, the losses from loans wiped out all of 
its earnings from 2005 and 2006, as well as three months worth of profits 
generated in 2004.227  When the profits disappeared, the CEO still kept his 
“performance” compensation.228 
In all, “Executives at seven major financial institutions that have collapsed, 
were sold at distressed prices or are in deep to the taxpayer received $464 
million in performance pay since 2005.”229  But these same firms recognized 
$107 billion in losses, and shed $740 billion in shareholder wealth since 
2007.230  The seven firms include American International Group, Bear Stearns, 
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WaMu management.  Id. 
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Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and 
Washington Mutual, each of which were central players in the subprime 
catastrophe.231  Thus, the CEOs of these firms were compensated based upon 
illusory profits—profits, in fact, that very soon transmogrified into staggering 
losses—yet, faced no liability or obligation to repay their “performance pay” 
when the losses sunk their firms.232  According to Amy Borrus, deputy director 
at the Council of Institutional Investors, “Poorly structured pay packages 
encouraged the get-rich-quick mentality and overly risky behavior that helped 
bring financial markets to their knees and wiped out profits at so many 
companies. . . . yet many of these C.E.O.’s have pocketed enormous 
compensation.’”233 
One telling feature of the subprime mortgage debacle involves the use of 
leverage—i.e., debt—to enhance short-term profits.234  Debt can be used to 
amplify the profitability of an investment so long as the cost of borrowing is 
less than the rate of return on the asset.  But the opposite is also true: Investing 
with borrowed funds can inflict greater losses if things go wrong.235  The 
subprime fiasco marks a high point in the use of leverage to generate higher 
earnings.  Indeed, the investment industry as a whole solicited a major change 
in SEC regulation: The SEC eliminated the net capital rule for the nation’s 
largest investment banks and allowed the banks to use as much leverage as 
their CEOs desired.236  This leverage turned toxic and resulted in huge losses 
when securities backed by subprime mortgages declined in value.237  Fire sales 
ensued as firms sought liquidity to unwind debt obligations.238  This excessive 
leverage could be expected to explode, as it has, in a system where CEOs 
benefit from short term profits and are insensitive to risk. 
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The options backdating scandal that came to light in 2006 should have 
triggered substantial reforms.239  It manifested a fundamentally flawed system 
of corporate governance.240  Essentially, CEOs lined their pockets through 
fraud and imposed huge deadweight losses upon shareholders.241  The 
subprime debacle repeated this dementia on a grander scale with greater losses 
to the American economy and the global financial system.242  At the bottom, 
CEOs systematically overreached for immediate compensation without regard 
to the welfare of shareholders, or systemic risk.243  These episodes demonstrate 
a compelling need to curb CEO autonomy.244 
The next part of this Article explains the deep sub-optimality of American 
corporate governance law.  CEO autonomy over the public corporation reflects 
CEO political and economic power. In particular, state law (especially 
Delaware) fails to reduce CEO autonomy to acceptable levels because the 
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political structure governing state corporate governance standards will evolve 
only in accordance with the interests of managers—not shareholders or the 
interests of the economy generally.  Thus, major federal intervention is 
necessary. 
III.  DELAWARE’S INFERIORITY 
The political dynamics of corporate governance yields suboptimal results 
and retards its evolution towards optimality.245  These political dynamics 
manifest themselves across federal246 and state jurisdictions,247 as well as 
within agencies such as the SEC.248  Indeed, senior SEC officials openly 
acknowledge the sway of special interests upon SEC policy.249  The most 
prominent domicile of public firms, Delaware, long ago declared its policy of 
promulgating pro-corporate laws.250  In the past, I have addressed the need to 
restructure the legal and regulatory framework governing corporate 
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governance to reduce its susceptibility to special interest influence.251  I have 
also suggested that before any fundamental reform can occur, sufficient 
political and economic power must be marshaled to support such reform.252  
The current economic crisis is conducive to fundamental reform, and this 
Article seeks to articulate an optimal vision of CEO autonomy in light of the 
lessons of the subprime fiasco.253 
Some scholars suggest that the current system of corporate governance 
tends towards optimality.254  Essentially they posit that states are incentivized 
to create ever more refined corporate governance standards to attract corporate 
franchise tax revenues.255  The empirical support for this vision of optimal 
corporate governance law is sketchy at best.256  Other scholars point out that 
firms seem to pursue the protection of anti-takeover legislation rather than any 
concept of optimal corporate governance, which entrenches management and 
destroys shareholder wealth.257  Recently, several scholars have settled upon 
 
 251. See Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law, supra note 12, at 347–58 (“[T]he 
fact that every change seems to operate to entrench the power of management and enhance the 
sway of the CEO over the corporation suggests that corporate federalism is ideally suited to the 
exercise of special interest influence . . . .”). 
 252. See Ramirez, Games CEOs Play, supra note 80, at 1585 (“Interest convergence theory 
holds that reform occurs when the interests of the racially oppressed align with the interests of the 
people who have the power to bring about reform.”). 
 253. See id. at 1606 (stating that the key to reform “is to exploit opportunistically events and 
political pressure”). 
 254. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–17 (1993) 
(stating that empirical evidence shows that choice among jurisdictions for incorporation “benefits 
rather than harms shareholders”). 
 255. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977) (“So far as the capital market is concerned, it is 
not in the interest of management to seek out a corporate legal system which fails to protect 
investors, and the competition between states for charters is generally a competition as to which 
legal system provides an optimal return to both interests.”). 
 256. Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820–21 (2002) (finding that empirical evidence does not support the 
conclusion that state competition for incorporations yields optimal corporate law outcomes).  
Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 
(2001) (finding evidence that Delaware corporations had higher firm value), with Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004) 
(“Delaware’s trajectory over the past 12 years is more consistent with the predictions of the race 
to the bottom view.”). 
 257. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 387 (2003) (“[A]ntitakeover protections are correlated with success in the 
incorporation market; adding antitakeover statutes significantly increases the ability of states to 
retain their local firms and to attract out-of-state incorporations.”).  The “overwhelming majority” 
of event studies show that antitakeover protections have either no effect on shareholder value or 
harm shareholder value.  Id. at 404–05 (citing, inter alia, GRANT A. GARTMAN, STATE ANTI-
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the view that rather than competing for corporate charters, Delaware is a 
monopolist, far more concerned with maintaining its privileged position than 
optimizing corporate law standards.258  Naturally, a monopolist will act to 
extract monopoly rents rather than to serve the nation’s interest in appropriate 
corporate governance standards.259 
Whatever the underlying causes, Delaware corporate law, combined with 
flaws at the federal level, is deeply suboptimal.  After the parade of scandals in 
2001–2002, scholars questioned the optimality of corporate governance 
standards yielded by the current system of corporate federalism.260  In a 2007 
article, I argued that the gap between the emerging science of corporate 
governance and the reality of corporate governance belied any competition 
among jurisdictions toward optimality.261  I instead posited that public choice 
and collective action problems explained the evolution of corporate 
governance law for public firms;262 by virtue of their positions, CEOs of public 
firms command concentrated economic resources and suffer no substantial 
collective action problems to impede their ability to organize because of their 
small numbers.263  These political dynamics took hold of corporate governance 
law at the state level as well as the federal level.264 
 
TAKEOVER LAW (2000)).  In addition, there is empirical evidence that such statutes operate to 
increase agency costs.  Id. at 405. 
 258. See Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial 
Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 13 tbl.2 (2006).  See generally Marcel 
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 
(2002) (discussing Delaware’s superiority in attracting corporations and maintaining its 
monopoly).  Ninety-seven percent of America’s public firms are incorporated in either Delaware 
or the firm’s home state.  Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1559, 1562 (2002). 
 259. For example, Professor Renee Jones argues that Delaware courts imposed “stricter 
judicial scrutiny” over management, in a possible effort to preserve Delaware’s position as the 
primary source of charters for public companies, after the fall of Enron.  Renee M. Jones, 
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 643–63 
(2004). 
 260. See id. at 663 (stating that the spate of corporate corruption in 2001–02 “reveals flaws in 
modern federalist arguments denouncing national-level regulation”). 
 261. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race, supra note 240, at 379–83 (“The science of 
corporate governance shows that there is no market pressure for optimal corporate governance; 
there is only market pressure for indulgent pro-management corporate governance law.”). 
 262. Id. at 383–84, n.223 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2, 11, 
165 (rev. ed. 1971) (stating that very large groups will not pursue organization to influence public 
goods like law because rational actors will instead assume that they can free ride on the efforts of 
others); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
335, 343 (1974) (stating the economic theory of regulation rejects the use of the term “capture” as 
“inappropriately militaristic,” but recognizes that private interests may subvert regulation). 
 263. See id. at 383–91. 
 264. See id. at 391–92. 
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Implicit in this vision of special-interest-driven corporate governance law 
is an inherently retarded evolutionary course for corporate governance law.  It 
could be expected to evolve in pro-management directions, but it would not 
evolve in ways that constrain the power of management, particularly with 
respect to CEO autonomy.  Thus, the duty of care would evaporate.265  Private 
securities litigation would be eviscerated.266  Anti-takeover legislation and 
similar impediments to hostile takeovers would thrive.267  Courts would be 
very reluctant to question compensation.268  Management would continue to 
monopolize the corporate proxy machinery.269  Even SOX did little to disrupt 
the power of the CEO beyond the audit function.270  All of this fits the 
collective action and public choice model of corporate governance 
lawmaking.271 
 
 265. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919, 927–28 
(1988) (“An eradication of fiduciary duties . . . would likely occur, however, if Delaware elects to 
amend its statute in order to incorporate the more lax provisions enacted by some states.”). 
 266. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now 
Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 6 
(1996) (“In forty federal securities law decisions, the Court decided thirty-two cases for 
defendants and, in almost every one, significantly narrowed the reach of federal securities laws.”). 
 267. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. 
FIN. ECON. 409 (2005) (“Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, 
substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest.”). 
 268. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling 
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 100 (1992) (“With the massive compensation now being awarded, 
courts have the perfect opportunity to find specific plans are unreasonable and unfair to 
shareholders, instead of shielding excess compensation practices with the business judgment 
rule.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and Modest Proposal for 
(Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 214 (1996) (stating that while some law suggests courts 
will enforce outer limits regarding compensation “in publicly-held corporations, in fact the courts 
just do not reach the merits of a claim of excessive compensation” because of difficult procedural 
hurdles). 
 269. See generally Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms: Big Biz Says Enough Already, BUS. WK., Feb. 
2, 2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate managers to stifle proxy reform); Amy Borrus & 
Mike McNamee, A Legacy That May Not Last, BUS. WK., June 13, 2005, at 38 (discussing 
business lobbying efforts to frustrate proxy reform).  Consequently, the entire SOX reform effort, 
including associated reforms in corporate governance at the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ Marketplace, has left CEOs in virtual unfettered control of the machinery of so-called 
corporate democracy.  See generally Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate 
Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 767 
(2003) (“For all the current talk of corporate governance reform, corporate democracy remains a 
myth.”). 
 270. See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of 
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 63–65 (2002) (concluding that SOX may be a 
“political fraud” because it failed to restore private litigation as one means of containing agency 
costs). 
 271. Illustrative of management’s facile autonomy over Delaware law is a recent Delaware 
innovation that allows managers to dispense with meeting face-to-face with shareholders.  In 
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The flip side of this vision of evolution in favor of CEOs is the total lack of 
any legal or regulatory innovation that would cabin CEO autonomy.272  In fact, 
Delaware is specifically structured to assure that no legislative modification of 
the corporation law could succeed without the support of management 
interests; the Delaware constitution prohibits changes to the corporation act 
without two-thirds approval in the legislature.273  Given the key role that the 
corporate bar plays in the Delaware legislative process,274 any amendment to 
the corporation code in Delaware simply must have management support.275  
Moreover, Delaware is concerned with maintaining its preeminent position, but 
has little concern over controlling agency costs or assuring that its corporate 
law either maximizes the financial performance of the public firm or that the 
public firm is macroeconomically optimized.276  So Delaware looks to federal 
 
2000, the Delaware corporation law was amended to provide for “virtual annual meetings.”  
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1779–80 n.136 (2006) (citing DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 211(e) (2006)). Shareholder 
advocates protested this innovation. Id. (citing Olga Kharif, Let’s Take an E-Meeting, BUS. WK., 
July 31, 2000, at 8 (quoting Nell Minow that with the “virtual meeting” managers  “never have to 
look [the] shareholders in the eye again”)). 
 272. Professor Hamermesh has provided a first-hand account of what motivates the attorneys 
who draft any changes to Delaware’s corporate code: 
It is a sufficient response to Cary at this point, in any event, to assert merely that today’s 
drafters of the DGCL do not devote an iota of conscious effort to make that statute more 
friendly to management and less protective of stockholders. To the contrary, as explained 
below, we favor a much more conservative approach that seeks to maintain whatever 
balance currently exists, and we are distinctly uncomfortable with any change that alters 
that balance in either direction. 
Hamermesh, supra note 271, at 1763–64. 
 273. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1897). 
 274. Hamermesh, supra note 271, at 1755 (“[T]he function of identifying and crafting 
legislative initiatives in the field of corporate law has been performed by the Corporation Law 
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association.”). 
 275. See id. at 1755–56 (discussing the process of crafting corporation legislation in Delaware 
and the pro-management parties involved). 
 276. Professor Hamermesh could not be clearer that Delaware simply does not care about 
managing agency costs, assuring that its law reflects empirical learning with respect to optimal 
corporate governance, or that the public firm serves the macroeconomic interests of the United 
States.  He lists the following policy concerns that drive Delaware law: 
[P]olicymakers are attentive to, and respond to, interstate competitive threats as well as 
potential federal expansion in the field of corporate law. Within those very broad limits, 
however, these policymakers act on conventional notions of (1) enhancing flexibility to 
engage in private ordering; (2) deferring to case-by-case development of the law, and 
avoiding legislation that is prescriptive and proscriptive; (3) avoiding impairment of 
preexisting contractual relationships and expectations; and (4) most importantly, avoiding 
legislative change in the absence of clear and specific practical benefits. Above all, 
Delaware corporate law is conservative. 
Id. at 1752.  The only conclusion to draw from Professor Hamermesh’s inside account of 
corporate lawmaking in Delaware is that it is simply not the job of Delaware to get corporate 
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law to control agency costs and to optimize the corporation from a financial 
and macroeconomic perspective.277  It is hardly Delaware’s fault that corporate 
governance in America is so deeply suboptimal; the blame lies squarely with 
the federal government because only the federal government is institutionally 
suited to impound the learning from economics, finance, and accounting, as 
well as the nationwide economic costs of allowing agency costs to fester.278 
To be fair, these narrow interests admit to their influence and claim that 
they leave the parochial interests of their clients out of their secret 
deliberations.279  But even those sympathetic to Delaware law recognize that 
management exercises influence over incorporations and that Delaware is 
keenly interested in maintaining its position as the leader in the market for 
corporate charters.280  Professor Lawrence Hamermesh has provided an 
insider’s account of how corporate law is made in Delaware, and the portrayal 
he provides is tailor-made for the exercise of special interest influence.281  
First, all amendments to the Delaware corporate law are crafted by the 
corporate bar, consisting of twenty-one Delaware attorneys.282  Second, these 
individuals meet in secret with no record of their discussions.283  Third, the 
 
governance right; instead they depend upon federal law to optimize corporate governance.  See id. 
(“Delaware can do and will do little if anything to stand in the way of [federal] responses.”). 
 277. Professor Hamermesh managed to write an entire law review article addressing the 
policy foundations of Delaware law with nary a mention of the term “agency costs.”  See id. 
 278. Professor Hamermesh states that when a legislative initiative to amend the DGCL is 
presented to the legislature, it moves “very promptly” to a vote.  Id. at 1754.  Additionally, 
Professor Hamermesh suggests that the legislators “have not taken on any significant role” in 
crafting legislation.  Id.  In light of these facts, hearings with testimony from experts seemingly 
gum up the works in Delaware.  Id. at 1753–56. 
 279. Hamermesh, supra note 271, at 1758. 
 280. See id. at 1753–54 (“Revenue from the state corporate franchise tax alone has in recent 
years constituted over twenty percent of the state’s budget, a fact of which Delaware legislators 
are intensely aware.”). 
 281. Id. at 1755 (“[F]or decades now the function of identifying and crafting legislative 
initiatives in the field of corporate law has been performed by the Corporation Law Section of the 
Delaware State Bar Association.  In particular, it is the governing body of the Corporation Law 
Section—its Council—that develops such initiatives.”). 
 282. Id. at 1755.  (“The Council currently consists of twenty-one members . . . . [S]even of the 
large commercial law firms in Wilmington have nominated two members each; the other 
members practice in smaller firms (or in my case, teach), all in Wilmington.”).  These twenty-one 
Wilmington attorneys are unelected, unaccountable to the American body politic, and apparently 
unconcerned with controlling agency costs within public firms; it would be difficult to imagine a 
less democratic or more economically pernicious means of making corporate law which 
incontestably affects the well-being of every American.  Professor Hamermesh provides the 
allocation of Council positions among the Wilmington corporate firms.  Id. at 1755 n.23. 
 283. Id. at 1757 (“For better or worse—and Council members would almost certainly say for 
better—the work of the Council proceeds in private.  There is a strongly held tradition that 
preliminary or potential legislative proposals are not to be discussed with or disseminated to 
persons outside the firms represented on the Council.”). 
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group is heavily tilted towards attorneys representing management interests.284  
Finally, there is virtually no partisan debate regarding amendments.285  
Professor Hamermesh suggests this makes for “conservative” lawmaking.286  I 
suggest that Delaware law simply cannot evolve in a direction that restrains the 
power of managers.287  I have previously remarked upon the chasm between 
the best empirical learning regarding corporate governance and standards 
prevailing in Delaware.288  And Professor Hamermesh articulates a lawmaking 
framework that explains this chasm.289 
Parts II, III, and IV all lead to the same conclusion: The current system of 
corporate federalism for public firms in the United States fails to curb agency 
costs, leaves too much autonomy in the hands of CEOs, and permits CEOs to 
pursue short-term profits without regard to risks.  The next part of this Article 
articulates a rationalized framework for controlling CEO autonomy within the 
public firm.  It will draw upon the lessons learned from the subprime 
meltdown as well as the empirical learning on CEO power discussed in Part II, 
above.  It will suggest major federal intervention to curb CEO autonomy in 
light of the above discussion regarding Delaware corporate law.  Specifically, I 
propose a legal restructuring of the board of directors with the specific goal of 
creating a substantial brake on CEO autonomy without impairing CEO 
operational power. 
IV.  METHODS OF CONTROLLING CEO AUTONOMY 
The remainder of this Article responds to the unfortunate reality that CEO 
autonomy is politically rigged to be suboptimal by articulating appropriate 
corporate governance organs that would operate to retether managerial power 
 
 284. Hamermesh, supra note 271, at 1756 (“[T]he members of the Council include a number 
of lawyers—a small minority, to be sure—whose litigation practice is dominated by 
representation of shareholder plaintiffs.”). 
 285. Id. at 1753 (“[V]oting on amendments to the DGCL is almost invariably unanimous.  
Plainly, then, the Delaware General Assembly has not perceived the content of the DGCL as an 
appropriate subject for partisan controversy.”). 
 286. Id. at 1752. 
 287. Professor Hamermesh suggests that Delaware is not pro-management because it protects 
minority shareholders against freeze-out mergers better than other states and its anti-takeover 
legislation is not as protective of management as some states.  Id. at 1763 n.60.  But it seems very 
unlikely that managers would wish to eliminate takeovers through state law because managers 
want to pursue takeovers to enhance their power.  Id.  And managers rarely have any interest in 
freezing-out minority shareholders—that is, typically something that benefits majority 
shareholders.  Id. 
 288. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law, supra note 12, at 347 (“The science of 
corporate governance shows that there is no market pressure for optimized corporate 
governance—there is only market pressure for indulgent pro-management corporate governance 
law .”). 
 289. See Hamermesh, supra note 271, at 1779. 
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to a rationalized system of legal restraint.  The basic approach is to respond to 
the patent shortcomings of corporate governance as revealed during the 
subprime crisis, summarized in Part III.  At the same time, this new proposal 
for a system of rationalized restraint will seek to vindicate the empirical 
learning summarized in Part II.  Finally, these proposals will respond directly 
to the failure of corporate governance law, largely promulgated in Delaware, to 
evolve in a manner that responds to the fundamental need to control agency 
costs within the public firm.  Simply put, this section will respond to the 
vacuum created in corporate law by Delaware’s domination. 
A. Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
At the center of the subprime mortgage crisis, a tradeoff between short-
term profits and risks festers, driven by compensation incentives for senior 
managers.290  The subprime fiasco rose from one of the “worst miscalculations 
in the annals of risk management.”291  There is little basis for leaving risk 
management exclusively in the hands of the CEO, and the flaws revealed 
during the subprime crisis highlight the shortcomings of leaving too much risk 
management power in the hands of the CEO.292  CEOs are too willing to rack 
up income and compensation today with little regard for risks down the road.  
This suggests more vigorous efforts to properly control risk at the public firm 
are appropriate.  Increasingly, financial experts and economists shoulder the 
science of risk management. 
The science of risk management suggests certain basic points.293  
Enterprise-wide risk management (ERM) seeks to control risk and limit 
excessive risks across the entire business enterprise.294  As such, ERM seeks to 
 
 290. Even the banks admit now that short-term compensation problems contributed to the 
subprime crisis.  See Michael Maiello, Paying Bankers Smartly, FORBES.COM, Feb. 19, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/19/paying-bankers-smartly-leadership-compensation_wall 
_street.html. 
 291. Tully, Money Machine Breaks Down, supra note 33, at 75.  According to Professor 
Stephen Bainbridge, “The financial crisis of 2008 revealed serious risk management failures on 
almost systemic basis throughout the business community.”  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark 
and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 978 (2009). 
 292. Confessions of a Risk Manager, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2008, at 72, 73.  (“Most of the time 
the business line would simply not take no for an answer, especially if the profits were big 
enough.”). 
 293. See generally Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management 
and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 591–94 (2008) (articulating new disclosure 
mechanisms for encouraging the application of enterprise wide risk management techniques to 
public firms). 
 294. Id. at 581 (“Currently, many organizations still continue to address risk in ‘silos,’ with 
the management of insurance, foreign exchange risk, operational risk, credit risk, and commodity 
risks each conducted as narrowly-focused and fragmented activities.  Under ERM, all risk areas 
function as parts of an integrated, strategic, and enterprise-wide system.”). 
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avoid “risk silos” and instead bring a diversity of views and perspectives to 
bear on risk management in a holistic fashion—meaning that no department or 
business discipline monopolizes the risk management functions.295  Instead, 
risk is controlled, calibrated, and coordinated across the entire business 
enterprise, with a view towards enhancing short-term and long-term 
shareholder value.296  According to rating agencies, favorable risk management 
practices encourage active involvement of the board of directors.297  
Institutional investors have also embraced the fundamental value of ERM, 
suggesting that firms that pursue the best risk management practices will enjoy 
a lower cost of capital.298  This supports empirical evidence suggesting that 
ERM adds firm value.299  As ERM continues to evolve, it should contribute 
further to firm value. 
Professor Betty Simkins and I previously proposed a new disclosure 
regime regarding ERM practices for public firms.300  We suggested that the 
SEC issue interpretive guidance regarding risk management systems so that 
capital markets could impound risk management into investment decisions.301  
This proposal predated the depths of the subprime mortgage meltdown.302  
 
 295. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”) 
defines enterprise-wide risk management as: “[A] process [a]ffected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its 
risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.”  Id. 
at 581–82 (quoting COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT–INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf). 
 296. Id. at 582, 583. 
 297. Id. at 584 (citing Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Findings on Corporate 
Governance in the United States and Canada: August 2003–September 2004 (Oct. 5, 2004), 
available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/05/200300000042 
9471.pdf). 
 298. Id. at 583–84; Robert E. Hoyt & Andre P. Liebenberg, The Value of Enterprise Risk 
Management: Evidence from the U.S. Insurance Industry 1 (Jan. 31, 2008) (unpublished paper 
from the 2008 ERM Symposium, “Risk in the Age of Turbulence”), available at 
http://www.ermsymposium.org/2008/pdf/papers/Hoyt.pdf. 
 299. Hoyt & Liebenberg, supra note 298, at 14 (finding that in the U.S. insurance industry 
ERM practices are associated with a 17% premium in firm value for public firms).  The authors 
searched a variety of databases for signals of ERM activity including the existence of a “Risk 
Management Committee.”  Id. at 2.  Despite the fact that there is a good reason to conclude that 
ERM adds value, surveys consistently show that overall firms lag in the implementation of ERM.  
Bainbridge, supra note 291, at 970–73.  Moreover, Delaware is unlikely to use fiduciary duty law 
to encourage the adoption of ERM.  Id. at 990. 
 300. Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 293, at 591–94. 
 301. Id. at 593. 
 302. The referenced article was completed in early 2008.  See generally id.  The proposal, 
therefore, did not benefit from the full revelations of corporate wrongdoing summarized in Part 
III. 
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Nevertheless, based upon the empirical record as it stood in 2008, we argued 
that firms should provide detailed disclosure of their risk management efforts, 
and that the SEC had issued similar interpretive guidance with respect to far 
less compelling issues.303  In early 2008, information regarding the scale of 
wrongdoing within public firms, or the resulting massive losses was not 
common knowledge.304  Therefore, I now propose a mandatory and 
independent risk management committee.  This call for a more demanding 
regime for ERM is based upon the manifest costliness of risk management 
failures on a systemic basis. 
The subprime mortgage experience teaches that much more needs to be 
done to assure rationalization of the risk management function, particularly 
within firms involved in financial innovation.305  Citigroup, for example, 
apparently failed to comprehend the risks of liquidity puts and SIVs—even 
Vice-Chairman of the Board, Robert Rubin, admitted these risks escaped his 
attention—and lost billions as a result, even as its CEO received millions in 
compensation.306  The Basel Core Principles for Bank Regulation provide that 
“Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place a 
comprehensive risk management process (including appropriate board and 
senior-management oversight) to identify, measure, monitor and control all . . . 
material risks and, where appropriate, to hold capital against these risks.”307  I 
posit that in light of the problems of regulatory arbitrage, such a requirement is 
 
 303. Id. at 593 (citing Disclosure of the Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages on the Operation of 
Issuers Subject to the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–5447, 34–10569, 3 SEC Docket 249 (Dec. 20, 1973) and 
Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences, 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–7558, 34–40277, 67 SEC Docket 1437 (July 29, 1998)). 
 304. One commentator has suggested, apparently without jocularity, that the widespread use 
of antidepressants in the wake of 9/11 contributed to the recklessness on Wall Street.  Peggy 
Noonan, There’s No Pill for this Kind of Depression, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at A9 (“The 
sale of antidepressants and anti-anxiety drugs is widespread.  In New York their use became 
common after 9/11.  It continued through and, I hypothesize, may have contributed to, the high-
flying, wildly imprudent Wall Street of the ‘00s.”).  As difficult as it is to explain the behavior of 
the CEOs of the firms at the center of this crisis, it could simply be old fashioned greed combined 
with easy money and the Minsky credit cycle.  See supra notes 98–115.  Either way, this Article 
proposes controls on CEO autonomy so that no individual (on drugs or otherwise) will have the 
power to sabotage public firms while attaining huge paydays.  See supra Part IV. 
 305. Fed chairman Ben Bernanke has already suggested more rigorous regulation of the risk 
management function and has explicitly endorsed ERM practices, as a means of addressing the 
deficiencies revealed by the subprime meltdown.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations, Financial Reforms to 
Address Systemic Risk (March 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm). 
 306. See supra Part II. 
 307. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision 5–6 (Sept. 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf?noframes=1. 
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particularly sensible for financial firms.308  Every financial firm that is publicly 
held should now be required to have an independent risk management 
committee, comprised of experts in some field of risk management; indeed, 
this corporate governance innovation makes sense for all public firms of 
sufficient size to face serious losses from the mismanagement of risk.309  Given 
that the options backdating fiasco transcended the financial sector, and given 
the reality that many elements of public entities like AIG’s derivatives trading 
subsidiary largely escape regulatory scrutiny, it is clear that a rationalized risk 
function is needed across public firms. 
In general, firms should be required to have an independent risk 
management committee as part of its board structure.310  This suggestion is 
patterned upon and could be implemented like the SOX approach to 
independent audit committees.311  Although I take issue with the SOX 
definition of “independent,” the basic statutory approach of SOX is sound—the 
committee should be mandated and composed of independent members.312  
The committee should have the power to retain experts or even appoint a chief 
risk officer.313  It should also have ultimate control over risk management 
policies.314  While operating within risk policies would continue to be under 
the operational control of the CEO, the risk management committee should 
have minimal expertise requirements.315  SOX responded to a crisis triggered 
 
 308. Fed chairman Bernanke has called for “consolidated supervision of all systemically 
important financial firms” so that no element of systemic risk escapes regulatory scrutiny. 
Bernanke, supra note 305.  The proposal that all public firms have an independent risk 
management committee would be a significant move in that direction, as all of the financial firms 
at the center of crisis are publicly held firms.  Id. 
 309. Risk mismanagement is pervasive across all types of firms.  See Simkins & Ramirez, 
supra note 293, at 573–77. 
 310. Since most of the problems with the subprime crisis arise from large public firms, 
exemptions intended to contain compliance costs at smaller firms may be deemed appropriate.  
The SEC exempted certain issuers from the independent audit committee requirements 
promulgated under SOX under this rationale.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(iv) (2008). 
 311. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2006). 
 312. See id. § 78j-1(m)(1), (3). 
 313. See id. § 78j-1(m)(5). 
 314. See id. § 78j-1(m)(4). 
 315. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006).  Expertise 
requirements vindicate the premises of ERM which seeks to avoid risk silos based upon different 
departments having different capabilities within the firm.  It also would be a significant step 
towards professionalizing the board of directors.  I argued in favor of a comprehensive 
professionalization regime for corporate directors in 2005.  See Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking 
the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can Law (and Professionalization) Fix “Minor” 
Problems of Externalization, Internalization, and Governance?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 
1008–09 (2005).  Recently, in light of the subprime fiasco, commentators are calling for further 
professionalization. Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, Management Needs to Become a 
Profession, FT.COM, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14c053b0-9e40-11dd-bdde-
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by audit failure; risk management failure as evidenced in the crisis of 2007–
2009 warrants a similar response, specifically, a mandated and independent 
risk management committee. 
The mandate for more sophisticated risk management within the public 
firm seems unlikely to cost much in light of the evidence thus far, suggesting 
that ERM enhances firm value.  It has the potential to greatly mitigate the 
problems associated with excessive CEO autonomy through more appropriate 
monitoring rather than any disruption of the CEO’s operational control. 
B. The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee 
Unlike audit reform, the SOX initiative to reform the legal compliance 
function failed insofar as its effort to encourage the use of Qualified Legal 
Compliance Committees (QLCC) is concerned.316  SOX imposed federal rules 
of professional responsibility upon attorneys appearing before the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and directed the SEC to promulgate 
regulations to implement this mandate.317  The SEC rules basically require 
attorneys “appearing and practicing before” the SEC318 to report certain 
material violations up the corporate ladder,319 all the way to the board if 
necessary to secure an appropriate response to any such report.320  Under the 
SEC rules, an attorney also has the option of reporting a material violation to 
the SEC.321  As part of its regulatory scheme implementing SOX, the SEC 
created a new corporate organ termed the Qualified Legal Compliance 
Committee.322  Firms could create a QLCC and avoid risks of disclosing 
 
000077b07658.html (arguing that the financial crisis shows the need for professional standards 
for firm managers). 
 316. Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of 
QLCCS, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005) (finding that as of September 30, 2005, only 
about 2.5% of all public firms had adopted the optional Qualified Legal Compliance Committee). 
 317. Section 307 of SOX directed the SEC to promulgate minimum standards of professional 
responsibility for attorneys appearing or practicing before the SEC.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
§ 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).  In promulgating such standards, the SEC created a new 
innovation—the QLCC.  See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
205.2(k), 205.3(c) (2008). 
 318. “Appearing and practicing” before the SEC is broadly defined to include any attorney 
advising a public firm with respect to disclosure of any information, transacting business with the 
SEC, or representing any issuer before the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a). 
 319. A material violation is a violation of state or federal securities law, a violation of a 
fiduciary duty, or a similar violation.  Id. § 205.2(i). 
 320. Id. § 205.3(b). 
 321. Id. § 205.3(d)(2). 
 322. Professor Rosen defines a QLCC as: 
[A committee] composed of independent directors, one of whom must be a member of the 
audit committee. It receives and investigates reports from attorneys working for the 
company who have credible evidence of material violations of laws, regulations, or 
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certain legal violations by the firm’s counsel as well as costs associated with 
counsel, weighing whether the firm has responded appropriately to a report of 
misconduct.323  Thus, the SEC encouraged the formation of a QLCC, but did 
not mandate its adoption.324  Few firms responded to the SEC’s 
encouragement. 
The linchpin for managing legal and reputational risk is the QLCC.325  
There is no requirement that a CEO be an attorney, nor should there be such a 
mandate.  The CEO, consequently, is not institutionally suited for managing 
legal risk.  The subprime mortgage crisis involved severe and pervasive 
violations of law; most notably, Countrywide paid a record amount to settle 
allegations of predatory lending, and Merrill Lynch paid $550 million to settle 
claims of securities fraud arising from its subprime securities activities.326  
CEOs incurred huge legal risks while receiving huge compensation payments.  
Certainly, more allegations of illegality are yet to come.  Nevertheless, the 
record is clear now that there is too much CEO autonomy to violate the law 
and earn millions while firms and the general economy are destroyed.  This 
presents a powerful theoretical and empirical case that CEOs should be 
stripped of exclusive autonomy over legal risks. 
Using the SOX reform of the audit function as a model, I suggest that an 
independent QLCC, comprised only of qualified attorneys, should be 
mandatory for public firms.327  Such a committee should have a broad mandate 
to hear complaints from broadly protected whistleblowers,328 as well as 
 
breaches of fiduciary duties. The QLCC makes recommendations to the entire board, the 
chief executive officer (“CEO”), and the general counsel or chief legal officer (“CLO”). A 
QLCC institutionalizes at the board level the company’s responsibility to obey the law. 
Rosen, supra note 316, at 1251 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2005)). 
 323. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Steven A. Ramirez, Legal Risk Post SOX and the Subprime Fiasco: Back to the Drawing 
Board, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: TODAY’S LEADINGS RESEARCH AND BEST 
PRACTICES FOR TOMORROW’S EXECUTIVES (J. Fraser and Betty Simkins, eds. 2010) [hereinafter 
Legal Risk]. 
 326. See supra Part II. 
 327. The SEC’s QLCC design inexplicably fails to include any requirement of legal expertise.  
See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.7 (2008).  Yet, requiring legal expertise to manage legal 
risk is sensible and would facilitate the further professionalization of board directorships.  This 
could spur other beneficial developments—such as limiting the number of directorships assumed 
or splitting the position of chair from the position of CEO—in firms where such innovations may 
add value.  See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 781, 818–20 (2003). 
 328. SOX provides very limited protections to whistleblowers.  Mary Kreiner Ramirez, 
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 183, 188  (2007) (“SOX does little to change the hazardous path whistleblowers must 
tread.”); Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, 
the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 
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attorneys, and to manage all material legal risks.329  Thus, my proposal to 
optimize the management of legal risk would require making the QLCC 
mandatory and enhancing it to respond to the reality of the subprime fiasco.  A 
robust QLCC, including some minor enhancements and extensions, should be 
associated with superior financial performance over the long term by removing 
legal and reputational risk from the exclusive control of the CEO, placing it 
instead in a more institutionally suited organ of corporate governance.330  
Unfortunately, public firms still fail to follow the law in an acceptable manner, 
and the subprime mortgage crisis demonstrates the pernicious economic effects 
of the lawlessness of just a few firms.331  Corporate governance mechanisms 
should at least operate to achieve a level of compliance commensurate with 
reasonable shareholder protection. 
C. Board Nominations 
Management dominates the process of director nominations and 
elections.332  Shortly after SOX was passed, and again in 2007, the SEC 
proposed new regulations intended to expand the ability of shareholders to 
nominate directors to the board of public firms.333  Intensive lobbying efforts 
unfotunately short-circuited these reform initiatives and ultimately, the SEC 
 
896 (2002) (“[T]he corporate whistleblower cannot just pucker and blow.  She has to use a great 
deal of thought to whether and how she may want to blow the whistle.”).  One major problem is 
that SOX protections only apply to allegations of securities violations made to a relatively narrow 
class of persons.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006).  Thus, for 
example, this provision would provide no protection for any putative Countrywide employee that 
chose to blow the whistle on the firm’s multi-billion dollar predatory lending racket.  See supra 
notes 157–61 and accompanying text.  Consequently, I propose expanding protection for blowing 
the whistle to the QLCC regarding any material violation of law. 
 329. This is a major improvement over the SEC’s more limited vision of the role of a QLCC.  
The SEC’s vision is actually focused upon compliance with the securities laws.  My approach 
recognizes that legal risk in the form of predatory lending damages is as dangerous as legal risk 
from securities fraud damages.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2008). 
 330. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 293, at 587–88 (arguing that CEOs are not 
institutionally optimal for exclusive risk management). 
 331. See supra Part III.  Even before the subprime meltdown, scholars noted the large costs of 
white-collar crime and the weak incentives for enforcement in this arena.  See e.g., Ramirez, 
supra note 325, at 226–27. 
 332. Bebchuk, supra note 79, at 732.  Shareholders have scored recent successes in their 
efforts to expand voting powers; but shareholders still lack the power to nominate directors short 
of launching an expensive proxy context—and this would key efforts to impose non-
accountability on management.  Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1259, 1307–08 (2009). 
 333. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 
2003) (not codified); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 
70,450 (proposed Dec. 11, 2007) (not codified). 
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declined to reform proxy voting.334  The American Law Institute suggests an 
independent nominating committee for board selections as a best practice.335  
The NYSE required in 2003 that listed firms maintain independent nominating 
committees.336  Commentators show that current practice permits substantial 
CEO involvement and influence over board selections.337  As Professor Jeffery 
Gordon points out, CEOs continue to fight “tooth and nail” against shareholder 
nominations.338 
Nevertheless, evidence supports the proposition that boards selected 
without CEO input enhance firm value.339  The evidence is mixed with respect 
to the efficacy of mere outside directors (i.e., those not otherwise employed by 
the firm), but boards with greater independence from the CEO are likely to 
have loss affinity to the CEO and will therefore be less likely to fall prey to 
unconscious bias in favor of the CEO.340  Further, firms with boards that have 
weaker CEO control and less entrenched management enjoy higher market 
 
 334. The SEC’s 2003 shareholder access proposal, which might have facilitated a limited 
degree of explicit shareholder influence over the selection of board members, was successfully 
opposed by the Business Roundtable. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: 
A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 557 (2005). 
 335. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
3A.04 cmt. c (1994). 
 336. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04 (2009).  NASDAQ’s rules require 
either a nominating committee or a practice under which nominations are made by the 
independent directors of the board.  NASDAQ STOCK MARKET INC., BY-LAWS ARTICLE III § 3.1 
(1998). 
 337. Murphy, supra note 83, at 148–49 (citing evidence that even independent nominating 
committees, subject to full disclosure requirements regarding their practices, do not nominate 
shareholder selections for the board). 
 338. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2007). 
 339. E.g., Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New 
Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999) (finding a higher stock 
market valuation when the CEO is not involved in the director selection process than when the 
CEO is involved).  Significantly, Shivdasani and Yermack distinguish between outside directors 
who have close links to the CEO versus more independent outsiders.  Id. at 1831. 
 340. Compare Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002) (finding no 
linkage between the proportion of outside directors and various measures of performance), with 
Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of 
Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 317 (2004) (finding that firms with more outside directors enjoy 
a lower cost of debt).  Professor Antony Page recently reviewed the social science evidence 
regarding in-group (or affinity) bias and its operation in the context of culturally monolithic 
boards.  Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 
248–49.  I have long argued in favor of more cultural diversity in break down homosocial 
reproduction.  Ramirez, Games CEOs Play, supra note 80, at 1600–12. 
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valuation.341  Professor Jonathan Macey suggests that the focus on independent 
directors is misguided, because even independent directors are not immune 
from capture by management.342  Instead, Macy suggests that only actively 
dissident directors are likely to mount challenges to management.343  In the 
end, there is wide agreement (other than by management) that the board 
selection process must be open to a wider array of candidates than just those 
selected by management in order to disrupt CEO domination of the board, 
break down affinity bias, and open the door to greater diversity in the 
boardroom. 
A key issue underlying board capture is compensation.  The more the CEO 
controls the board, the more evidence there is of excessive compensation.344  
Thus, the reforms of the director selection process are associated with lower 
compensation.345  As highlighted in Parts II and III, above, compensation 
practices contributed to the entire financial system gorging on risk, particularly 
leverage.346  Management may harbor legitimate concerns about having 
dissidents on a board, unqualified directors, and board conflicts with CEOs that 
 
 341. When directors are selected without management involvement, closed-end mutual funds 
trade at higher valuations relative to net asset value.  Raj Varma, An Empirical Examination of 
Sponsor Influence over the Board of Directors, 38 FIN. REV. 55, 75 (2003) (finding that closed-
end mutual fund sponsors capture boards and that the market values boards selected without 
sponsor involvement).  Professor Lucian Bebchuk summarizes the empirical record with respect 
to insulation that operates to entrench managers, and concludes that “the evidence indicates 
clearly that current levels of board insulation are costly to shareholders and the economy.”  
Bebchuk, supra note 79, at 714. 
 342. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 
90 (2008). 
 343. Id. at 90–91. 
 344. See, e.g., Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The 
Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 947–50 (2003) (“[T]he 
number of mutual director interlocks is found to be significant and positively associated with total 
compensation.”). 
 345. E.g., Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, CEO Compensation and Board Structure 2 
(Sept. 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=901642&rec=1&srcabs=220851.  Firms that complied with new independence 
requirements and did not comply with those requirements prior to the reforms “significantly 
decreased CEO compensation in the period after the rules went into effect” relative to firms that 
complied all along.  Id.  “The decrease is on the order of 17%, after taking into account 
performance, size, time-varying shocks to different industries during that period, firm fixed 
effects, and other variables affecting compensation that changed during that time.”  Id. 
 346. The market capitalization of the financial sector recently contracted beyond the 
contraction of technology stocks after the tech bubble burst.  “That the financial sector’s value 
could evaporate as quickly and as ruthlessly as the technology sector did demonstrates just how 
ephemeral the gains were, built on excessive leverage and business strategies that amount to little 
more than gambling.”  David Gaffen, Collapse of the Financial Sector Harder, Deeper Than 
Tech Wreck, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at C5. 
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could lead to impaired monitoring.347  Still, the subprime fiasco supports the 
notion that right now, CEOs have too much autonomy over the composition of 
their board, and are able to use that power to gain distored compensation 
arrangements. 
Perhaps a solution to the problem is to give shareholders a choice between 
nominees selected by incumbent management through a fully independent 
nominating committee and those nominated by shareholders and approved by 
the independent nominating committee.348  Contested elections in corporate 
America are not unprecedented.349  In fact, one large institutional investor 
permitted contested elections for several decades, and found that it resulted in 
“vitality and energy” at the board level and could lead to new ideas or fresh 
talent in the boardroom.350  According to one CEO of the firm, its performance 
during the period of contested elections was “extraordinary.”351  So, the 
concept of contested elections has been tested, to some extent.352 
This proposal that management include shareholder nominees in its proxy 
builds upon recent reforms.353  It could finally give meaning to corporate 
 
 347. See John H. Biggs, Shareholder Democracy: The Roots of Activism and the Selection of 
Directors, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 494–96 (2008) (cataloging objections to direct shareholder 
nominations and elections of board directors, including that: board members could turn the 
boardroom into a political battleground, the entrepreneurial spirit of American business could be 
diminished, adverse directors may damage board dialogue, and such boards may be too focused 
on compliance issues rather than enhancing shareholder value). 
 348. TIAA-CREF, a large institutional investor serving professors, allowed contested 
elections since its founding through a policyholders nominating committee that essentially 
allowed shareholders to nominate directors.  Id. at 503.  The policyholders nominating committee 
was appointed by the full board of trustees.  Id. 
 349. Over a period of sixty-six years, sixty-nine policyholder nominees prevailed in contested 
elections, which attracted a large percentage of proxy participation—up to thirty percent.  Id. at 
502, 503. 
 350. Id. at 504–05. 
 351. Id. at 504. 
 352. In 1942, the SEC staff proposed the inclusion of shareholder nominees on management’s 
proxy.  Murphy, supra note 337, at 136.  Five years later, the Commission adopted the present 
rule governing access to management’s proxy—and denied access for director elections.  Id. 
(citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Fed. Reg. 8768, 8770 (Dec. 24, 1947)).  The present 
rule is now at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2008).  Id. at 136 n.21. 
 353. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions, Exchange Act Release No. 34–
48,825, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,992, 66,998 (Nov. 28, 2003) (requiring disclosure of nominating 
committee’s policy regarding shareholder nominees).  A number of other scholars propose similar 
incremental reforms.  See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing 
Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 
475 (2008) (proposing the use of technology to facilitate shareholder nominations to the board).  
As Professor Gordon highlights, for a variety of cost and liability reasons, the key to facilitating 
shareholder nominations is access to management’s proxy.  Id. at 479–82. 
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democracy and the proxy ballot.354  Shareholders could have access to the 
nomination process and could even attain board representatives.355  Yet current 
management would act as screen on shareholder nominations to assure that 
capable and nonhostile shareholder nominees would appear on the ballot.356  
Only otherwise unaffiliated shareholders could nominate directors, or 
shareholding managers (or close associates) could subvert the shareholder right 
to nominate.357  Such directors must have no substantial social or economic 
relationship with current management.358  No doubt, detailed regulations would 
be needed to address these and a plethora of other issues.359  Nevertheless, the 
basic approach is simply to give shareholders an expanded voice on board 
selections with minimal interference with legitimate managerial 
prerogatives.360 
In fact, that is the common thread to all of the reforms discussed above.  
Management power to manage the firm operationally is left intact.  Yet, those 
corporate governance elements charged with monitoring the CEOs 
performance and pay are enhanced.  Risk is monitored by the board, subject to 
the operational authority of the CEO.  Similarly, legal risk would be 
operationally monitored by the board, but initially controlled by the CEO; the 
 
 354. This proposal ideally would be accompanied by other reforms of corporate democracy 
that would enhance the franchise rights of shareholders without impairing the ability of 
management to operate the business with a view to maximizing financial performance.  See Joo, 
supra note 269, at 758–60, 767 (listing impediments to shareholder franchise rights and 
concluding that “corporate democracy remains a myth”). 
 355. Biggs, supra note 347, at 502–03. 
 356. This screening mechanism vitiates the primary objection of management interests in 
greater shareholder access to the nominating process—the prospect that board seats will go to 
persons uninterested in shareholder value.  See Bebchuk, supra note 334, at 563–65, 566–68. 
 357. As Jonathan Macey points out, there are powerful social mechanisms at work in the 
boardroom through which CEOs can effectively capture their boards.  MACEY, supra note 342, at 
51–68.  To meaningfully break down this complex of norms and conventions, independence must 
be more robustly defined. 
 358. The nominating committee would have final say identifying the contestants for board 
seats.  Thus, it is important to expand the modest definition of “independent” that has been used 
so far by the SEC or the NYSE and the NASDAQ.  As I have pointed out before, a college 
roommate could satisfy these definitions of independent.  See Ramirez, Games CEOs Play, supra 
note 80, at 1584 n.3 (citing David Enrich, Capital Federal Financial Director Reynolds to Resign, 
DOW JONES CORP. FILINGS ALERT, Dec. 30, 2003, WL 12/30/03 FEDFILE 19:42:00). 
 359. Professor Bebchuk’s proposal for reform of the proxy system addresses many of the 
issues I have in mind.  He proposes, inter alia, that shareholder votes be by secret ballot.  
Bebchuk, supra note 79, at 704–06.  Such a reform would be necessary to give full effect to the 
contested elections approach I advocate here. 
 360. On June 10, 2009, the SEC proposed new proxy reforms that would greatly expand 
shareholder power to nominate board directors.  Facilitating Shareholder, Director Nominations, 
74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 10, 2009).  This proposal is consistent with the thrust of the 
proposal herein. 
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main emphasis would be to assure legal compliance and that management 
should be stripped of the ability to pursue profits today at the expense of legal 
sanctions absorbed by the firm tomorrow.  Finally, the CEO’s power to select 
the monitors—the board—is curtailed with no impact on operational control.  
Theoretically and empirically, there is good reason to think that these 
innovations would enhance the financial performance of the board while 
reducing agency costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Excessive CEO autonomy played a central role in the subprime mortgage 
crisis that continues to grip the U.S. economy.  Specifically, corporate 
governance law in the United States permits CEOs of public firms to generate 
current income to enhance their own compensation without regard to risk.  The 
cost of this excessive autonomy reaches into the tens of trillions of dollars, 
across the globe.  Although many factors coalesced to create the subprime 
fiasco, most all of the misconduct flowed through public corporations in the 
United States.  At the very least, corporate governance standards failed to 
mitigate the subprime fiasco in any meaningful manner and probably 
exacerbated the economic maelstrom through its perverse incentives for top 
managers and its failure to reduce agency costs.  In the end, the power of CEOs 
to accumulate income while crashing their firms, unfettered by the rule of law, 
proved disastrous. 
Corporate governance law must be reformed.  The reforms must 
comprehend that corporate governance must function during periods of crisis 
as well as periods of stability.  Financial crises are inherent to modern 
capitalism and corporate governance must be designed with recognition of 
inherent instability.  The subprime mortgage crisis demonstrates the inferiority 
of U.S. corporate governance to withstand stress and contain agency costs.  
While it is hard to imagine an economic crisis more severe than the present 
disruption, left undisrupted, CEOs will eventually see the profits they might 
garner by imposing huge risks tomorrow in exchange for huge compensation 
today.  Delaware law (and by extension, state law generally) will not evolve in 
a manner that curtails CEO autonomy; in fact, Delaware law seems oblivious 
to controlling agency costs.  Thus, federal law must respond to the subprime 
crisis and create a system of corporate governance for public companies that 
mitigates agency costs. 
Reforms must address the perverse incentives imposed upon CEOs by the 
current system of corporate federalism.  CEOs are the new potentates, with 
power to crash global capitalism and rake in millions for the favor.  The rule of 
law must reassert itself.  CEO power must be diminished.  At the very least, 
the power of CEOs to manipulate risk, to stack the board with their own 
clones, and to skirt legal compliance must be diminished.  The current system 
of CEO primacy has proven itself crisis prone and macroeconomically 
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dangerous.  There is no sound reason to continue to indulge CEO power, only 
political reasons.  We can ill afford a continuation of CEO primacy.  The cost 
of failing to address the costs of CEO primacy now must be counted in the 
trillions.  Surely the law stands for more than the infinite enrichment of the 
CEOs of the largest financial institutions in the world. 
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